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CRIMINALIZING (POOR) FATHERHOOD
Cortney E. Lollar*
States prosecute and incarcerate thousands of fathers every year for failing to pay
their child support obligations. Ostensibly, these prosecutions aim to foster the
health and well-being of children without requiring the child’s mother to bear the
costs of raising the child alone. What may appear on the surface to be a system that
balances out inequities is actually a deeply flawed government program—one that
promotes criminal recidivism and reinforces the poverty of indigent fathers.
Contrary to the common image of a “deadbeat dad” raking in money and staying
on the lam to avoid helping a mother raise their child, the vast majority of fathers
who owe large amounts of child support make little to no income. These fathers do
not pay their child support obligations because they are unable to. Once a state
prosecutes and imprisons an indigent father, his odds of being able to pay that debt
diminish even more. The criminalization of failing to pay child support is
unconstitutional and revives prohibited debtors’ prisons. Fathers of lesser means
are being incarcerated for failing to pay a private debt owed to their child’s mother
or for not reimbursing the government for costs provided to the mother in the form
of state assistance. In other words, an indigent father may be criminally sanctioned
for not subsidizing the government’s welfare programs. Relying on antiquated ideas
about a father’s role in the family, the child support system punishes poor fathers
for their reproductive choices and morally condemns them for bringing a child into
the world without being able to provide for her financially. This Article calls for an
end to the criminalization of failing to pay child support and proposes several
fiscally responsible changes to the current system that will improve the welfare of
children whose parents are no longer together.

INTRODUCTION
On April 4, 2015, Walter Scott was pulled over in North Charleston,
South Carolina, for driving with a broken taillight. As most people know
by now, Mr. Scott fled on foot and was ultimately shot in the back by the
police officer who pulled him over. Why did Mr. Scott run? According to

* James & Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
My deep gratitude to Albertina Antognini and Susan Appleton for their thoughtful comments and
insights on earlier drafts, all of which challenged and expanded my thinking about the issues discussed
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Christopher Bradley, Michael Cahill, Jenny Carroll, Mihailis Diamantis, Deborah Dinner, Jim
Donovan, Martha Albertson Fineman, Ann Freedman, Timothy Grall, Meredith Harbach, David Kwok,
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his family, Mr. Scott owed over $18,000 in child support.1 He missed a
court date related to his failure to pay the child support, and a warrant
issued. His brother says he ran because he did not want to have to spend
more time behind bars and face the loss of another job as a result of his
failure to pay and the subsequent warrant.2 “Every job he has had, he has
gotten fired from because he went to jail because he was locked up for
child support. . . . He got to the point where he felt like it defeated the
purpose.”3
Subsequent to Mr. Scott’s death, the child support system stayed on the
public radar for a short period of time.4 But the concerns about the system
raised by Mr. Scott’s death have faded. Police departments have continued
to make sweeps for “deadbeat” parents,5 and legislatures have pushed
through new laws that further curtail the options available for a parent with
outstanding child support obligations. Even nonlegislative agencies have
promulgated punitive policies. For example, the Texas Attorney General
recently implemented a new measure prohibiting a parent with a delinquent
child support obligation from renewing his car registration.6 The everpresent threat of criminal prosecution and incarceration looms large for
parents who simply cannot afford to pay their outstanding child support
obligations, trapping men of little or no means “in a cycle of debt,
unemployment, and imprisonment.”7
Increasing numbers of parents, primarily fathers, are prosecuted and
incarcerated for failing to pay child support.8 Although national data is not

1. Frances Robles & Shaila Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-lose-jobrepeat.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., id.; Eli Hager, For Men in Prison, Child Support Becomes a Crushing Debt, WASH.
POST (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/for-men-in-prison-child-support-beco
mes-a-crushing-debt/2015/10/18/e751a324-5bb7-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html?utm_term=.dda
01d0cf936.
5. Joshua Sharpe, ‘Deadbeat’ Parents Arrested in DeKalb Sheriff’s Holiday Sweep, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/news/local/deadbeat-parents-arrested-dekalb-sheriffholiday-sweep/83l1xVHLYS4QLuDyVDZceK/.
6. Madlin Mekelburg, Texas to Tie Car Registration Renewal to Child Support, TEX. TRIB. (June
14, 2016, 6:00 AM), www.texastribune.org/2016/06/14/child-support-evaders-vehicle-registration-rene
wal.
7. Robles & Dewan, supra note 1.
8. Another, likely larger, group of people are incarcerated on other charges but have an outstanding child support order. See, e.g., Child Support and Incarceration, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS (June 6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarce
ration.aspx. Some states do not currently allow parents to modify their child support obligations while
incarcerated. See id.; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
OVERVIEW – FINAL RULE 2016 FLEXIBILITY, EFFICIENCY, AND MODERNIZATION IN CHILD SUPPORT
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kept, at least one source asserts that about 50,000 people are incarcerated in
the United States for this offense.9 Another study out of South Carolina
found one in eight of those incarcerated in county jails were there for
failure to pay.10 In Georgia, 3,500 parents were incarcerated for outstanding
child support obligations in a single year.11 An estimated one-quarter of
inmates in federal or state prison have an open child support case.12
All states have civil mechanisms to enforce child support orders, but
increasingly, states are relying on criminal sanctions to remedy a parent’s
failure to pay child support. This situation is untenable for several reasons,
two of which are discussed in more detail in this Article. First, poor fathers
are being incarcerated for not having the money to support their children.
These prosecutions not only violate the Constitution but also contravene
the prohibition on debtors’ prisons. Poor fathers are being punished with
incarceration for not having the money to support their children.
Second, and even more troubling from an institutional perspective,
fathers with little to no income are helping finance the government’s child
support enforcement system. Federal law requires custodial parents who
receive state assistance to assign their child support payments to the state.13
Thus, any child support payment by the noncustodial parent will go straight
to the government as reimbursement for the state assistance it has provided
to the custodial parent. If the father does not pay the child support as
ordered, even when the failure is due to insufficient income on which to
live and pay the debt, the government punishes the fathers with criminal
charges or possible incarceration for not reimbursing the cost of the state
assistance. In other words, poor fathers are being criminally sanctioned and
incarcerated for failing to finance the government’s welfare programs and
child support system, despite their inability to do so.
Legislators and courts provide two primary justifications for a system
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/overview_
child_support_final_rule.pdf.
9. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, ALISON M. SMITH & CARLA BERRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42389, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: INCARCERATION AS THE LAST RESORT PENALTY FOR
NONPAYMENT OF SUPPORT 2 (2012). A 2005 report surveyed newspaper articles and other data sources,
seeking to compile as much information as possible about this type of case. That survey documented
large numbers of arrests in each state for failure to pay child support. REBECCA MAY & MARGUERITE
ROULET, CTR. FOR FAMILY POLICY & PRACTICE, A LOOK AT ARRESTS OF LOW-INCOME FATHERS FOR
CHILD SUPPORT NONPAYMENT: ENFORCEMENT, COURT AND PROGRAM PRACTICES (2005).
10. Child Support and Incarceration, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (June 6,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarceration.aspx; Robles &
Dewan, supra note 1.
11. Robles & Dewan, supra note 1.
12. DANIEL R. MEYER & EMILY WARREN, CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS AND THE INCARCERATION
OF NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS 2 (2011), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c130/5f6e35f52013e576abbb7c
9e363d66bc744e.pdf.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2012).
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that prosecutes and incarcerates poor fathers who fail to pay a private debt
owed to their child’s mother or a public debt owed to the government as
reimbursement for state assistance: child welfare and state fiscal wellbeing. The government desires to protect children by ensuring their basic
needs are met, but it does not want to bear the financial costs of providing
that support. A closer look at the current child support system, however,
reveals that it does little to enhance a child’s well-being or the government’s coffer.
One of the most critical determinants of a child’s well-being is having a
healthy relationship with both parents. Our current child support system
actively discourages paternal contact by imposing unrealistic expectations
on a father to pay child support he often cannot afford. Thus, the government in essence pushes the father away from his child, punishing the father
for having a child he is unable to financially support. Not only is a child’s
welfare diminished under the current system, but the economics underlying
the system are both inefficient and morally troubling.
As already mentioned, a significant portion of the child support system
is subsidized by the child support payments made by men of little or no
means. Statistics show that the state spends significant resources to
identify, pursue, and incarcerate fathers who have very little chance of ever
being able to pay the amount of child support they owe. States also seem to
ignore the reality that once a father is convicted and incarcerated, even if
only for failing to pay a child support obligation, that conviction and period
of incarceration substantially diminish the father’s ability to obtain a steady
job with reliable income in the future. Prosecutions of so-called “deadbeat
dads” decrease the odds that those fathers will be able to pay both the child
support initially owed and the considerable arrearage and interest that have
accumulated, and which continue to accumulate, on that initial debt.
The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) trumpets its system
as “cost-effective.”14 But the cost-effectiveness calculations are somewhat
misleading. Broadly related data is lumped together in the OCSE’s analysis, making it difficult to truly ascertain how much child support money is
going from noncustodial parents to custodial parents, and how much is
simply going to the government for “reimbursement.” A close look at the
data suggests that the child support system is a cyclical system of federal
subsidies and poor fathers’ child support payments going in and out of state
coffers to provide financial backing for the system. Somewhere in the
middle are the child and her custodial parent, who often benefit minimally,

14. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD
SUPPORT 2016: MORE MONEY FOR FAMILIES (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/progra
ms/css/2016_preliminary_report_infographic.pdf.
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if at all, from the noncustodial parent’s payments. Additionally, because the
OCSE does not supervise the prosecutorial arm of the child support
enforcement system, the OCSE’s cost-effectiveness analysis does not
include the sizable costs the states bear for the prosecution and/or incarceration of noncustodial parents. Available information establishes that most
of the outstanding child support debt in this country is owed by poor fathers
who are unlikely to ever be able to pay what they owe. In light of such
data, it is hard to overcome the presumption that a system relying on the
financial contributions of these men is poor policy, financial or otherwise.
These troubling validations raise the question of how states can justify
the prosecution and incarceration of fathers for failing to pay a child
support debt. The only logical conclusion is that we are pursuing criminal
sanctions to ensure that as a society we have vehemently communicated
our moral condemnation of a father for bringing a child into this world who
he is unable to financially support. We are punishing these fathers for their
reproductive decisions, for having “irresponsible sex,” and for not living up
to our societal expectation of fatherhood. Criminal charges communicate
moral condemnation for these sexual choices and, if a parent is convicted,
carry an unshakeable, lifelong stigma. The stigma associated with having a
criminal conviction is a punishment that usually lasts much longer than the
more palpable deprivations of incarceration and state supervision in the
form of probation or parole. Being branded a “criminal” carries broad,
indefinite, and quantifiable ramifications.15 For most, these life-long
deprivations are every bit as real a part of the punishment as the technical
sentence imposed by a judge in a criminal case.16
Recent literature has recognized the increasingly problematic role that
criminal justice fines, fees, and costs (also known as “legal financial
obligations”) play in the criminal justice system.17 But most of the criminal
law scholarship has focused on the criminal justice debt that occurs after a
finding of guilt or sometimes after arrest.18 On the family-law side, exten-

15. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 519 (1996); cf. John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037,
1049–55 (2009) (discussing long-term effects of prison on well-being).
16. Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 107–08 (2014).
17. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in
the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483 (2016); Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary
Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175 (2014); ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites
/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf; see also Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the
Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014); Lollar, supra note 16; Leah A. Plunkett,
Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (2013); cf. Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015).
18. See sources cited supra note 17.
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sive literature discusses child support obligations through various lenses,19
but no family law scholar has approached the topic of child support
obligations through a criminal law lens.20 Scholars such as Melissa Murray,
Andrea Dennis, Shani King, and Tracey Meares have joined Dorothy
Roberts in drawing attention to the overlap between criminal law and
family law.21 However, the topic of how the criminal system approaches
child support has largely evaded consideration.22
In light of the large number of people incarcerated after a conviction
for failing to pay child support, this failure to evaluate the criminalization
of child support obligations seems a substantial oversight. This Article
seeks to fill that gap. The child support system falls in the nexus between
the increasing focus on legal financial obligations on the criminal-law side
and the focus on the treatment of fathers in the context of child support on
the family-law side. It challenges the justifications for criminalizing the
failure to pay child support and analyzes the impetus and impacts of
making the failure to pay a crime. This Article challenges both the current
manifestation of our child support laws and the underlying theoretical
structure in which these laws are anchored. Not only are the laws implemented in a manner that disproportionately affects poor men, particularly
poor men of color, but the very notion of criminalizing the failure to
provide financially for one’s biological child is grounded in moral
judgments about sexual behavior and antiquated, structurally flawed ideas
about fatherhood that no longer resemble reality.
Part I presents a brief overview of the child support system and
provides information about the fathers largely affected by it. Part I also lays
out how, contrary to popular belief, a small percentage of indigent fathers
owe the bulk of the national child support debt. Part II identifies two
particularly troubling aspects of the child support system. First, the manner
in which our child support system operates violates the Fourteenth

19. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward
Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 617, 622–33
(2012); Laurie S. Kohn, Money Can’t Buy You Love: Valuing Contributions by Nonresidential Fathers,
81 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 63–64 (2015).
20. See Andrea L. Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 287–90,
296–98 (2017).
21. Id. at 287–88, 297; see also Elizabeth D. Katz, Family Law as Criminal Law: The Forgotten
Origins of Modern Family Laws and Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (draft available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168243); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law,
and the Legal Constructions of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253 (2009); Melissa Murray, The
Space Between: The Cooperative Regulation of Criminal Law and Family Law, 44 FAM. L. Q. 227
(2010); cf. Cynthia Godsoe, Redrawing the Boundaries of Relational Crime, 69 ALA. L. REV. 169, 178
(2017) (challenging scholars’ assertions that family and criminal law have little overlap).
22. But see Katz, supra note 21 (discussing history of the criminalization of nonsupport
obligations).
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Amendment and our country’s prohibition on debtors’ prisons. Fathers of
little or no means are prosecuted and incarcerated for being unable to pay a
private debt to the mother of their child. Likewise, if the state provides
“welfare benefits” to the custodial mother, the law requires the noncustodial father to reimburse those benefits or face prosecution and incarceration for that failure. Second, the system operates on the backs of poor
fathers. The child support system purportedly aims to ensure the health and
well-being of children while simultaneously protecting the financial health
of the state. Upon closer inspection, however, the system does not seem to
do either of these things particularly well.
In light of these deficiencies, Part III addresses the question of why we
would continue to utilize such a system. Part III concludes that states
continue to criminally prosecute and incarcerate poor fathers for being
unable to pay these debts because, as a society, we want to send a message
of moral condemnation about fathers who have irresponsible sex and fail to
live up to their roles as “providers.” Our society has chosen to punish poor
men for their reproductive choices and for bringing a child into the world
and not financially providing for her. Part IV proposes some changes to the
current system to address the problems identified throughout the Article.
I. A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM
The majority of men who reach adolescence will become fathers.23
“The most enduring historical definition of a father has been as breadwinner”24 or “provider and protector,”25 with the emotional and nurturing
role of fatherhood only recently beginning to take a stronger secondary
role.26 Many men, particularly those with little income, feel a significant
obligation to fulfill these roles for their children, whether they are ultimately in a position to do so or not. The pressure some men feel to meet
this expectation, especially when they know the expectation is one they are
not financially or emotionally able to meet, can lead them to absent themselves from their children’s lives.27

23. NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 22 (2000); Peter B. Gray, On Non-Dads (Or
Childless Men): How often do men become fathers and why?, PSYCH. TODAY: THE EVOLVING FATHER
(Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-evolving-father/201311/non-dads-or-childl
ess-men.
24. DOWD, supra note 23, at 37.
25. Javiette VaShann Samuel, Breaking the Cycle of Absent Fathers: Highly Involved AfricanAmerican Nonresidential Fathers Describe Their Roles and Responsibilities Beyond Biological
Paternity 10 (May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee) (on file with
author).
26. DOWD, supra note 23, at 33–38.
27. Cf. id. at 23–24.
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Yet the law has done little to acknowledge and respond to the
vulnerabilities unearthed by fatherhood. Our current child support system
highlights this failure. From as far back as the 1700s, and carrying through
to today, states enacted punitive laws requiring a child’s biological father to
provide financial support for that child,28 regardless of whether the father is
or can be physically or emotionally present in the child’s life. States
enforce this requirement, especially when the custodial parent (usually the
mother) receives state assistance, even if the noncustodial parent (usually
the father) similarly makes little income. Child support laws place both
“the burden and responsibility of poverty squarely on the backs of
fathers.”29 These laws particularly affect fathers of color with low incomes.30 Under our current legal structure, those men who may have had a
precarious financial status prior to fatherhood often find their financial
exposure deepened by their transition into fatherhood.
A. The Structure of the Child Support System
Whether a parent is married determines much about that parent’s legal
relationship with his or her child. When a child is born, if she is the child of
dual-gender married parents, the law attributes paternity to the man married
to the mother of the child.31 However, if the mother is unmarried, a state
official usually comes to obtain a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity
(VAP) before the mother leaves the hospital with her child.32 The VAP is a
signed affidavit from the mother (and father, if he is there) asserting the
identity of the child’s father.33 This document is transmitted to the office of
vital records and, if not rescinded within sixty days, becomes the final legal
determination of paternity.34
28. Katz, supra note 21, at 13–21; Kohn, supra note 19, at 63–64. Elizabeth Katz has a rich
discussion of the history of how nonsupport became criminalized. “[I]n the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, charity leaders saw existing approaches to enforcing men’s family support duties as
inadequate and pushed for criminalization . . . . [R]eformers initiated a century-long effort to categorize
family support duties in whatever manner [criminal or civil] promised the most advantageous
combination of high coercion and reach with low process and cost.” Katz, supra note 21, at 9.
29. Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 907 (2013).
30. Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family
Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 147–51 (2016); Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke:
Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (2006).
31. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 358 (2012); Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and its Discontents:
Establishing Modern Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. REV. 2037, 2038 (2016).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii) (2012); Baker, supra note 31, at 2048–49.
33. Baker, supra note 31, at 2048–49.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(1); Baker, supra note 31, at 2049. This determination may be
challenged later, but only on the grounds of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(5)(D)(iii); Baker, supra note 31, at 2049.
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Regardless of how paternity is established—by marriage, a VAP, or
some other route35—the designation of legal fatherhood confers both rights
and responsibilities.36 As a father, a man is entitled to have contact with his
child, and in the event of a custody dispute, he has standing to request
greater custody rights.37 However, an unmarried father has the burden of
affirmatively asserting his paternal interest in the child in order to have a
hearing on the matter.38 Once paternity is established, a father also incurs
the responsibility for child support.39 If the father and mother remain
together, these rights and responsibilities are divided up informally
between the two parents within the parental relationship. In the event that
the parents separate, the law often intervenes to determine the scope of
these rights and responsibilities for each parent.
When married parents split up, the legal mechanisms are relatively
clear. The parents file for divorce, and generally as a part of that proceeding, judges make or accept determinations about child custody,
visitation, and child support. For divorcing parents, child support orders
usually are only one aspect of a court order put into place at the dissolution
of a marriage. Often the divorcing parents decide on the custody, visitation,
and support arrangements on their own, prior to appearing before the court,
and the judge simply signs off on their agreement.40 Although the laws are
technically gender neutral, statistics show that courts more often grant
mothers sole physical custody or a substantial portion of the custody of a
child and order noncustodial fathers to pay child support to the nowcustodial mother on behalf of the child.41 In 2016, four of every five
custodial parents were mothers.42 Most states do not require courts to grant
a visitation order to the noncustodial parent, generally the father, as a
precondition to that parent’s obligation to pay child support.43
The procedures are less clear when nonmarried parents split up.

35. Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67
STAN. L. REV. 167, 203 (2015).
36. These rights and responsibilities are often more limited for nonmarried fathers than married
ones, however. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 31.
37. See Baker, supra note 31, at 2049.
38. Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405, 416 (2013); Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and
Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2334 (2016).
39. A mother also receives these rights and responsibilities.
40. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979).
41. Huntington, supra note 35, at 181–83.
42. TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-262, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND
THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2015, at 3 (2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publicat
ions/2018/demo/P60-262.pdf.
43. Huntington, supra note 35, at 183.
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Typically, similar to when married parents divorce, mothers in nonmarital
relationships retain custody of the child. Although the noncustodial unmarried fathers could go to court to secure custody rights or visitation with
their child, usually they do not.44 Custodial time is usually worked out
between the parents informally.45 As a result, unmarried custodial mothers
generally regulate the father’s access to their child, essentially becoming
“gatekeepers” to the father’s ability to see and spend time with the child.46
If the father maintains a good relationship with the mother, he is able to see
his child; otherwise, he may be out of luck.47 Because visitation or custody
is not a prerequisite or corequisite to a child support order, the fact that a
father may not be able to access or claim his rights does not affect his
obligation to pay child support. If a mother remarries, the biological
father’s rights become more limited, as courts continue to privilege the
marital relationship over biological fatherhood.48
In the case of nonmarried parents, an informal system of custody,
visitation, and support could be maintained indefinitely, but if the custodial
parent sues for child support or requests “welfare” benefits from the state,
such actions trigger state involvement.49 If a custodial parent sues for child
support and provides sufficient evidence of need and paternity, either a
court or an administrative agency will issue a child support order to the
noncustodial parent. Upon issuance of the order, the state becomes the
enforcement arm should the noncustodial parent fail to comply with the
order. If paternity has not already been legally established, via a VAP or
some other mechanism, federal law requires the custodial parent to assist
the state in locating the noncustodial parent and establishing paternity.50 If
a custodial parent fails to help the state establish legal paternity, the state
can deny her child support altogether or deduct 25% or more of the
payments she might otherwise receive.51
However, when the custodial parent files for state assistance, as
opposed to requesting child support, the law is a little more complicated.
Federal welfare law requires custodial parents who receive state assistance

44. Baker, supra note 31, at 2049; Huntington, supra note 35, at 194.
45. Baker, supra note 31, at 2050.
46. Huntington, supra note 35, at 194–95.
47. Id. at 195.
48. Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2372, 2379–80. Mayeri discusses the racial and class dynamics that
influenced, and continue to influence, how the law has developed on this point. Id. at 2377 (“[N]onmarital fathers began their quest for rights burdened by deep-seated cultural images, inflected by race
and class, branding them as derelicts and deadbeats.”).
49. Baker, supra note 31, at 2050. When that happens, some noncustodial unmarried parents then
make a formal, legal claim for custody rights. Id.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 302.31(b) (2017); cf. 45 C.F.R. § 302.17.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2).
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to identify and locate the noncustodial parent (and if paternity is not
established, to actively assist the government in legally establishing paternity52) and then to assign their right to collect child support payments from
that noncustodial parent to the state.53 Even if the custodial parent has no
interest in involving the noncustodial parent, federal law will not allow her
to receive state welfare benefits without identifying the father of her child,
establishing a child support order, and assigning any child support received
over to the state. Under this system, the state and federal governments then
retain any child support obligations paid by the noncustodial parent as
reimbursement for the “welfare benefits” the state paid to the custodial
parent.54 Thus, if a custodial parent receives state assistance, the government will seek reimbursement of that state assistance from the noncustodial
parent. As a result, the government is the beneficiary of many child support
payments.55
The law’s treatment of nonmarried, low-income parents has negative
repercussions for both parents.56 For custodial parents—primarily
mothers—receiving state assistance, the financial support they receive each
month is unrelated to whether the noncustodial parent pays child support;
their financial picture remains the same either way.57 Custodial parents
receive the same amount of financial assistance from the government
whether the noncustodial parent makes a child support payment or not, and
any payment by the noncustodial parent goes straight to the government to
pay it back.58 As such, custodial parents do not directly benefit when the
other parent of their child is able to contribute financially.
For a mother who does not receive state assistance, the act of suing for
child support also can result in more limited financial contributions. Once a
child support order is officially entered, the government can subject a
father to prosecution and punishment, including incarceration, if he does
not or cannot pay.59 Either of these sanctions decreases the odds that the
mother will receive additional income from the father of her child.
If a noncustodial father is prosecuted for failing to pay child support,
he will have significant difficulty finding a stable, well-paying job due to
52. Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 302.31(b); cf. 45 C.F.R. § 302.17.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 302.50; see also Brito, supra note 19, at 625; Tonya L.
Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 253 (2000).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1); Brito, supra note 53, at 253.
55. Brito, supra note 53, at 253 n.108.
56. See generally JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 195–220 (2014) (discussing
the implications of the fact that “courts and lawmakers describing, explaining, enacting, and
implementing family law systematically fail to consider the legal regulation of poor families”).
57. Brito, supra note 19, at 625.
58. Id. at 625–26.
59. See id. at 655.
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having the conviction on his record. If he also is incarcerated due to his
failure to pay child support, he will make little to no income during that
period of incarceration, and when he is released, he will suffer the longterm ramifications of having a gap in his employment record, in addition to
the criminal conviction.60
Child support debt continues to accrue while a father is incarcerated
and, in most states, continues to collect interest as well.61 As a result, when
the father is released, he will have greater debt and less likelihood of being
able to pay it. Unlike most other debts, child support debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.62 The consequence is that, like Walter Scott, a father
convicted and incarcerated for failing to pay child support will likely cycle
in and out of the criminal justice system over his lifetime, as the odds of
him being able to pay that debt will only decrease with each conviction and
period of incarceration. Obviously, this result is not beneficial for the
father, the mother, or their child.
Regardless of how the child support order comes to be, the amount of
the order is determined based on a formula.63 In 1988, Congress imposed a
requirement on states obliging them to set up child support guidelines.64
Federal regulations establish minimum standards for such guidelines65 and
require that each state use “specific descriptive and numeric criteria” to
calculate the child support obligation.66 Each child support order must be
“based on the noncustodial parent’s earnings, income, and other evidence
of ability to pay.”67 This “other evidence” must include, “at a minimum,”
the noncustodial parent’s assets, residence, employment and earnings
history, job skills, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal
record and other employment barriers, and record of seeking work, as
well as the local job market, the availability of employers willing to hire
the noncustodial parent, prevailing earnings level in the local community,
and other relevant background factors in the case.68

60. A noncustodial parent incarcerated under a civil regime will suffer the same consequences
from incarceration but without the stigma of a criminal conviction on his record.
61. See ELAINE SORENSEN, LILIANA SOUSA & SIMON SCHANER, THE URBAN INST., ASSESSING
CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN NINE LARGE STATES AND THE NATION 8 (2007), https://www.urban.org/si
tes/default/files/publication/29736/1001242-Assessing-Child-Support-Arrears-in-Nine-Large-States-an
d-the-Nation.PDF.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 656(b) (2012).
63. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.605 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125B.070 (LexisNexis 2010).
64. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103(a), 102 Stat. 2343, 2346 (1988)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b) (2012)).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2017).
66. Id. § 302.56(c)(4).
67. Id. § 302.56(c)(1) (emphasis added).
68. Id. § 302.56(c)(1)(iii).
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The regulation specifically provides that “incarceration may not be
treated as voluntary unemployment in establishing or modifying support
orders.”69 Federal law requires states to impose a rebuttable presumption
that any child support order based on a state’s child support formula is “the
correct amount of child support to be awarded,”70 although several courts
have found the rebuttable presumption portion of the statute unconstitutional.71 The law also requires mandatory restitution in the amount of the
unpaid support obligation.72
In many states, the child support formula compels consideration of
“potential” income, rather than actual income, if the parent is currently
unemployed or “underemployed.”73 Likewise, some child support guidelines require payment, albeit a minimal one, even if the parent has no
income.74 Judges have little discretion to deviate from the guidelines;
rather, they are instructed just to apply the formula.
Any future adjustments to child support orders continue to rely on
these same formulas.75 The law requires states to review the child support
determination at least every three years.76 But a parent cannot deviate from
the state-ordered obligation. If the parent’s income level changes, that
parent can petition the court or administrative officer for a modification,
but only in that circumstance. The law leaves no room for informal or
variable arrangements, or modifications of child support orders in real time
or retroactively;77 those permutations simply are not permitted. At least one
federal court has recognized that
the issuance of a support order by a Court does not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the parent involved will have the ability to pay that
obligation . . . . In many cases, the parent is not even before the Court to
contest the order and his or her ability to make the payments is thus the
result of an ex parte proceeding with little or no evidence presented on the
issue.78

69. Id. § 302.56(c)(3).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2012); see also 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(f) (stating that the formula is “the
correct amount of child support to be ordered”).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Pillor, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056–57 (N.D. Cal. 2005); United
States v. Morrow, 368 F. Supp. 2d 863, 865–66 (C.D. Ill. 2005); United States v. Grigsby, 85 F. Supp.
2d 100, 107 (D.R.I. 2000).
72. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 228(d) (2012)).
73. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(a), (d) (LexisNexis 2010).
74. See, e.g., id.; KAN. CT. R.P., CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES app. II.
75. 45 C.F.R. § 303.8(b)(4)(ii)(A) (2017).
76. Id. § 303.8(b)(1).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C) (2012).
78. United States v. Grigsby, 85 F. Supp. 2d 100, 107 (D.R.I. 2000).
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This inflexible system may work effectively for fathers of means, but
as will be discussed below, most of the fathers delinquent on their child
support payments are not people of means. The resulting system sets up
fathers with little to no income for a perpetual cycle of poverty, incarceration, and stigma. This system diminishes the odds of the fathers ever
paying off their child support obligations and does little to improve the
financial circumstances of either the custodial mothers or the children for
whose benefit this system is purportedly in place. The government is
arguably the only party benefitting from this current set up, as it can require
these indigent fathers to reimburse it for some of the costs of its welfare
system. But even the government likely will not benefit financially from
this system, as it will be out the costs of prosecution and incarceration
when these fathers inevitably cannot make the payments as ordered.
B. Debunking the Myth of the “Deadbeat Dad”
Predictably, with such a strict system, noncustodial parents often are
unable to comply with their court-ordered child support obligations. Yet,
the view of fathers who cannot provide for their children as “lazy,” “loathsome,” “idle from choice,” and evasive of responsibility is pervasive and
deep-seated.79 Rather than recognizing that many fathers do not choose to
fail to support their children, many lawmakers and much of the public
continue to presume that fathers who do not support their children are
intentionally avoiding their main parental obligation—that of providing
money for their children. Recent changes in the law’s approach to child
support obligations rely on the assumption that large numbers of fathers
attempt to skirt their obligations voluntarily.
To be fair, this belief is not without some foundation. By 2010, the
total amount of child support arrearage accumulated nationwide since the
federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) came into being in
1975 exceeded $110 billion.80 Although 43.5% of custodial parents
received the full amount of child support due in 2015, 30.7% received no

79. Our country has a long history of legally condemning a father’s failure to financially support
his children. See, e.g., DOWD, supra note 23, at 31; AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 102–
40 (1998); Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and
Punishment in Early American Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1145, 1147 (1999); Kohn, supra note 19, at
63–64; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the
Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1654, 1659–61 (2005).
80. JESSICA PEARSON, NANCY THOENNES & RASA KAUNELIS, CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH,
DEBT COMPROMISE PROGRAMS: PROGRAM DESIGN & CHILD SUPPORT OUTCOMES IN FIVE LOCATIONS
2 (2012); SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61.
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payment at all.81 In 2015, the year with the most recent available data,
approximately $13.6 billion of child support obligations did not get paid.82
The rate of nonpayment to custodial fathers was not statistically different
from the rate of nonpayment to custodial mothers.83 The poverty rate of all
custodial families in 2015 was 26.8%, nearly 10% higher than the national
average, and the poverty rate for families with the mother as custodial
parent was 29.2%.84 Factors indicative of whether a custodial parent will
receive payments include the custodial parent’s age, level of education,
race, and marital relationships. Those who are under thirty, have less than a
high school education, have no contact with the noncustodial parent, or
have never been married are the least likely to receive child support
payments.85 Fathers who have never married are less likely to pay full child
support than divorced fathers.86
Yet, recent data and social science studies have shown that a small
number of noncustodial parents owe most of the debt.87 A study of nine
states showed that 11% of the noncustodial parents with a child support
obligation owed 54% of the debt; each of the individuals included in that
11% owed over $30,000 in child support.88 National levels mirror those
nine states.89
The general profile of the fathers who owe large amounts of child
support debt does not match our stereotype of a well-funded father on the
lam, trying to avoid financially helping a struggling mother who is raising
their child and trying to make ends meet each month. About one-quarter of
all noncustodial parents have incomes below the federal poverty level.90
81. GRALL, supra note 42, at 12.
82. More than 40% of the $33.7 billion in child support owed was not received by custodial
parents; $20.1 billion was received, indicating that $13.6 billion was not. Id.
83. Id. at 6 tbl.2.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 12; TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-255, NEW CUSTODIAL MOTHERS
AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2013, at 10–11 (2016), https://www.census.gov/content/da
m/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/P60-255.pdf.
86. Huntington, supra note 35, at 190.
87. PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3; SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER,
supra note 61, at 1.
88. SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 1–2. By contrast, many of the other
noncustodial parents subject to child support orders owed either no or relatively small amounts of child
support debt. Id. at 2 (revealing that 15% of those with child support obligations in nine states owed no
child support arrears at the time of the study, while another 16% owed less than $500). National levels
revealed similar numbers. Id.
89. Id. at 2 (showing that, as of April 2006, 43% of the country’s child support arrears were
owed by 10% of those with child support obligations, each owing $40,000 or more).
90. ELAINE SORENSEN, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, THE STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS: A
GOOD INVESTMENT 2 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/sbtn_csp_is_a_
good_investment.pdf. In fact, Congress knew a substantial number of child support obligors fell below
the poverty threshold when it passed PRWORA. Brito, supra note 19, at 632.
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Almost 75% of parents owing large amounts of child support debt either
had no reported income or reported incomes of $10,000 a year or less.91
Many of their child support obligations have been in effect for at least ten
years.92 The public’s general assumption seems to be that these parents
have some type of unreported income or assets that they are simply
withholding or failing to disclose to the courts in order to avoid paying.
Although this undoubtedly happens on occasion, only a small percentage of
parents who have an ability to pay child support do not pay.93 In at least
one study, 93% of parents with child support obligations reporting income
over $10,000 had paid child support in the past year, whereas only 57% of
parents with no or low reported income made payments during that same
time period.94 Approximately a quarter of parents who did not report consistent annual income were either incarcerated or disabled,95 and 42% of
them lacked a high school degree or GED.96
Despite their minimal incomes, the majority of parents with no or low
incomes pay something toward their outstanding support orders.97 Not
surprisingly, however, when parents with no or low incomes who are in
arrears on child support obligations make payments, they pay only small
percentages of the amounts they owe.98 One significant factor as to why
these fathers with low or no incomes pay so little is that they cannot afford
to pay the monthly amounts they owe. Of those earning $10,000 or less a
year at the time of the study, the median amount of their child support
orders represented 83% of their reported incomes.99 A survey of ten states
revealed that, for noncustodial parents with reported incomes below the
poverty line, child support payments constituted 69% of their incomes.100
Another study of five states found that noncustodial parents with reported
incomes of $500 or less per month had child support obligations averaging
over 100% of that income, and for those earning $500 to $1,000 per month,

91. PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3; SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER,
supra note 61, at 3. Only 20% of those owing child support who had no debt reported incomes this low.
Id.
92. SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 3.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 5; see also KAREN GARDINER, MIKE FISHMAN, SAM ELKIN & ASAPH GLOSSER, THE
LEWIN GRP., ENHANCING CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS THROUGH IMPROVED USE OF
INFORMATION ON DEBTOR INCOME, at iv, 17 (2006), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/74966/rep
ort.pdf.
96. PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3.
97. SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. PEARSON, THOENNES & KAUNELIS, supra note 80, at 3.
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their support obligations ranged from 21% to 60% of their earnings.101
In many states, child support debt is increased by interest assessed on
that outstanding debt, a consequence of a 1986 change in federal law
wherein Congress enacted legislation requiring a parent’s child support
arrears to be considered a “judgment.”102 The amount of money owed in
child support has increased dramatically since that time, as most states
began accruing interest on child support obligations.103 Between 1987 and
2005, states that charged interest often experienced a tenfold increase in the
amount of outstanding child support debt.104
As a result of all of these factors, “relatively little of these arrears are
likely to be collected.”105 In fact, one recent study suggests that only 40%
of child support debt is likely to be collected within the next ten years,
despite the panoply of penalties, punishments, and other enforcement
measures states have at their disposal.106 Parents with low reported incomes
(under $10,000 annually) are expected to pay approximately 27% of their
arrearages over the next ten years, while parents with no reported income
are expected to pay only 16%.107
The misconceptions about who owes the child support debt in this
country inevitably continue to shape our legal and societal response to the
issue. Legislators, prosecutors, and courts assume, despite all evidence to
the contrary, that punishment is an effective method of deterring nonpayment and incentivizing fathers with delinquent child support obligations to
pay up. But if fathers do not have the money to do so, no threat of
conviction and punishment is going to draw blood from that stone. The
legal system’s failure to recognize who owes the child support debt has led
to a troubling and unconstitutional system of child support enforcement.
II. FAILURE TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT IS THE NEW DEBTORS’ PRISON
If a noncustodial parent fails to pay the requisite child support as
ordered, criminal prosecution is a tool in the arsenal of child support
enforcement agencies in every state. Criminal prosecutions for failure to
pay child support are supposed to be last-resort options, given the presence

101. Id. at 3–4. “Only at higher income levels exceeding $2,000 per month did monthly child
support obligations comprise more realistic percentages of incomes, ranging from 8 to 21 percent.” Id.
at 4.
102. SORENSEN, SOUSA & SCHANER, supra note 61, at 8.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 40.
107. Id. at 50.
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of civil enforcement options also available in every state.108 However,
given the increasing number of men incarcerated for failing to pay, this
option of “last resort” appears to be one used with staggering regularity.
Although incarceration for contempt is also a regularly utilized civil
sanction for nonpayment, states are employing criminal prosecutions in an
unsuccessful attempt to deter parents from nonpayment, and more successfully, to aggravate the punitive impact of such nonpayment on delinquent
parents.
The utilization of criminal prosecution as an enforcement tool has
particularly troubling implications. The crime of failure to pay child
support is unlike most other crimes at the state and federal level, as it is a
crime based solely on one’s failure to pay a debt.109 Although incarcerating
someone for failing to pay a debt would seem to violate our oft-touted
rejection of debtors’ prisons, the Supreme Court has sanctioned laws
permitting a person’s incarceration for failing to pay a child support debt,
so long as there is sufficient evidence that the failure to pay was
“willful.”110 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that incarcerating someone who cannot afford to pay postconviction criminal fines
or fees—who is not “willfully” failing to pay—is a violation of the Constitution.111
In criminal nonsupport cases, the Court has not established this same
threshold. Under many state child support laws, judges are not required to
determine whether a person alleged to be delinquent on child support
payments has the ability to make those payments.112 Either the fact of a
108. The Social Services Amendments of 1974 provided federal jurisdiction for courts to hear
civil enforcement actions against a noncustodial parent for child support. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 460, 88
Stat. 2337, 2358 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 660 (2012)).
109. The crime of willfully failing to pay one’s taxes, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (2012), is the
only other crime of failure to pay of which this author is aware. This crime is more akin to a crime of
fraud, as it generally involves some type of active misrepresentation or affirmative omission in a
manner quite distinct from the issues in child support cases. Many states do incarcerate people for
failing to pay traffic-related tickets or other citations, but I am referring to actual criminal offenses here.
Likewise, those with a conviction are often incarcerated for failing to pay criminal justice fees or fines,
but usually they are locked up pursuant to a revocation of probation or parole because their failure to
pay is a violation of a condition of their probation or parole. Generally, those who fail to pay these
criminal justice fees and fines are not charged with a new crime based solely on that failure to pay.
110. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983).
111. See id. at 668–69; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (holding that incarcerating someone for involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court cost violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause when the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum imprisonment for the crime); cf. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (considering civil contempt sanctions for
nonsupport); Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (addressing criminal contempt
sanctions for nonsupport); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (holding that converting a fine-only
punishment into a sentence of incarceration when someone is indigent violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
112. See infra notes 136–37.
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valid child support order or the noncustodial parent’s knowledge of such an
order is sufficient evidence for a judge to find criminal liability.
Although some may be troubled by the Supreme Court’s willingness to
uphold the constitutionality of sanctioning someone for failing to pay a
debt, regardless of ability to pay, the prosecution and incarceration of
someone unable to pay that debt should be deeply troubling even to the
Court, as it certainly appears to be a violation of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses and the spirit of the Court’s precedent in this area.
The Court has been abundantly clear in case law that the “critical” due
process issue is a defendant’s ability to pay. Before incarcerating someone
for failing to pay child support pursuant to a civil or criminal contempt
order, or for failing to pay any other type of criminal justice fine, the law
requires the court to determine whether the defendant is able to pay that
financial obligation.113
Thus, despite consistent Supreme Court precedent, legislatures and
courts seem to be skirting the Constitution based on the distinction that, in
a child support case, the outstanding financial obligation is not a fine or fee,
nor a contempt finding, but is the basis for the criminal charge itself. States
are regularly prosecuting and incarcerating people for being unable to pay
off private debts owed to the other parents of their children, or public debts
owed to the state after the state fronted money for the support of their
children. Each of these bases for criminal charges is deeply troubling and
both should be found unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection–Due Process analysis.114
113. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447–48 (holding that the state must provide procedural safeguards
to ensure that due process is not violated by incarcerating someone who is unable to pay); Feiock, 485
U.S. at 637–38 (recognizing a defense of inability to pay in criminal contempt proceedings for failure to
pay child support); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668–69 (finding a violation the of Due Process Clause for the
lower court not to inquire as to willfulness of failure to pay).
114. The Fourteenth Amendment is not the only constitutional provision violated by the current
child support system. Although courts have not yet been persuaded by the Thirteenth Amendment
argument and have failed to consider the Eighth Amendment argument, an argument that these constitutional provisions also are violated by our current child support system has substantial merit.
Because they are beyond the scope of this Article, the arguments are mentioned only briefly below.
(1) Thirteenth Amendment: Requiring a person to pay a debt he cannot afford to pay is a violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary servitude and forced labor. See United
States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999); Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go
to Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 948–55
(2016). At least one circuit court has acknowledged that “[i]mprisoning someone for failure to pay a
debt can run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment,” Ballek, 170 F.3d at 874, as the way out of the debt
could only be through a person’s labor. However, that court ultimately concluded that “child-support
awards fall within that narrow class of obligations that may be enforced by means of imprisonment
without violating the constitutional prohibition against slavery.” Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, the
parent–child relationship is “much more than the ordinary relationship between debtor and creditor,”
and as such, the parent assumes a “moral obligation to provide the child with the necessities of life.” Id.
In other words, forcing a parent to work in order to support his child is not a constitutional violation,
whether the parent wanted that role or not. Despite this circuit court’s ruling on the issue, it is unclear
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A. An Exception to the Legal Prohibition Against Debtors’ Prisons?
Both the federal government and most states abolished debtors’ prisons
by the 1870s.115 Yet, despite this prohibition, most states do not ban
imprisonment for “noncommercial debt” stemming from criminal court
involvement or a failure to pay child support.116 In other words, a single
exception appears to justify permitting both types of criminal debts—legal
financial obligations and child support obligations—to fall outside most
state prohibitions on debtors’ prisons. This “exception” developed relatively recently when, in the 1970s and 1980s, an increasing number of states
passed statutes allowing for the incarceration of a person who failed to pay
his criminal debt.117 The only limitation became the constitutional strictures

why the parent–child relationship should be exceptional in this way. The court cites to the long history
of the state using “coercive power” to enforce child support obligations, even stemming before the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 874 n.2, 875. But the fact that a practice is grounded in
history does not compel the conclusion that it is constitutionally sound. (2) Eighth Amendment:
Another compelling argument might be made under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.
The Excessive Fines Clause “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in
kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
265 (1989)). According to the Supreme Court, “fines” refer to payments made to the state as
punishment for an offense. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998). For noncustodial
parents whose payments are going to reimburse the government for the state assistance it already has
provided to the custodial parent, the payments are going to the state. Arguably, however, those
payments are not punishment, placing them outside the category of fines contemplated by current
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. However, although the initial child support orders may not constitute
fines, once a person has been charged with and convicted of the criminal offense of failing to pay child
support, a strong argument can be made that the inevitable restitution order entered in the case—the one
requiring the noncustodial parent defendant to pay the amount of child support owed pursuant to the
restitution order in the criminal case to the government—violates the Eighth Amendment. See Lollar,
supra note 16, at 148–49, 152–54 (arguing that criminal restitution orders are subject to the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause); supra note 72 and accompanying text. As previously discussed,
the amount of child support ordered by a court or administrative officer in a given case is based on a
formula which often is not the appropriate one to use for determining how much a noncustodial parent
realistically can afford to pay in child support. If the child support order, as incorporated into the
restitution order, is for an amount that the noncustodial parent realistically cannot pay, the parent has a
compelling Excessive Fines Clause argument, as the criminal restitution order is for that same amount.
Thus, if the initial order is beyond a parent’s ability to pay and that amount is incorporated into the
criminal restitution order requiring the defendant to pay the state, this amount is excessive and a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Lollar, supra note 16, at 148–49, 152–54.
115. Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1628–29.
116. Appleman, supra note 17, at 1489–90; Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1629. This “noncommercial debt” stands in contrast to private debt, such as that resulting from unpaid credit card debt,
so-called “payday loans,” medical bills, and other debts owed to private companies. Birckhead, supra
note 17, at 1626. Incarceration is still a possibility with private debt, as the creditor can sue the debtor in
civil court to collect the debt, and if the court decides the debtor’s failure to pay is “willful,” or if the
debtor fails to show otherwise, criminal contempt is a possible sanction. Id. Thus, private contractual
debt also can subject someone to incarceration. Id. at 1629.
117. Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1629.
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provided by the Supreme Court in a trio of cases culminating in Bearden v.
Georgia.118
In Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state
could automatically revoke a person’s probation for failing to pay a fee or
fine without any consideration of that person’s ability to pay.119 Although
the parties argued the issue on equal protection grounds, the Court found
that “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s
analysis.”120 As the Court articulated,
one must determine whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant’s
indigent status may be considered in the decision whether to revoke
probation. This is substantially similar to asking directly the due process
question of whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for
the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable to pay the
fine. Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the
issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis,
but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as “the nature of the
individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the
rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and]
the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.”121

The Court found that “the reasons for nonpayment” were “of critical
importance.”122 If a probationer willfully fails to pay a fine, restitution, or
fee when he has the means to pay, imprisonment is a permissible sanction.123 Likewise, if a person has not made “bona fide efforts” to seek
employment in order to pay off the criminal justice debt, imprisonment is
justifiable.124 But if someone has made reasonable efforts to pay off the
debt and simply is unable to do so, “it is fundamentally unfair” for courts
not to consider “whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the
defendant are available.”125 If the court has determined that a fine or restitution is the “appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime,” it cannot
then convert that sentence into a sentence of incarceration solely because
the person does not have the ability to pay that fine or restitution.126 To do
so is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.127
In theory, Bearden should have significantly changed the criminal
118. Id. at 1629–33.
119. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1983).
120. Id. at 667.
121. Id. at 666–67 (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
122. Id. at 668.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 668–69.
126. Id. at 667–68.
127. Id. at 673.
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justice landscape. Yet, the number of people incarcerated for failing to
fulfill their criminal justice obligations has exploded since Bearden. As of
2015, approximately ten million people owed more than fifty billion dollars
in criminal debt.128 Courts have come up with creative ways to technically
comply with Bearden while simultaneously circumventing the spirit of the
ruling. Some judges do not inform defendants of their right to have a
hearing on their ability to pay outstanding criminal justice debt;129 other
courts operate a “fines or time” sentence, requiring defendants to choose
between immediately paying the criminal justice debt or serving time in
jail.130 Some courts have implemented a system where a defendant agrees
to pay the criminal justice debt as part of the plea agreement, making the
failure to pay a violation of the plea agreement and skirting Bearden’s
holding because Bearden himself went to trial.131 Still other courts have
either directly flaunted Bearden or, at the very least, engaged in a broad
interpretation of the term “willful.”132 State courts are in conflict as to
whether the State or the defendant has the burden of proving whether the
failure to pay was willful.133
Although lower federal courts and some state courts have expansively
interpreted the “willful failure-to-pay” standard,134 this standard has been
accepted as the applicable standard in determining whether a convicted
defendant should have his probation or parole violated for failing to pay his
criminal justice debt. By contrast, the Supreme Court has not established a
due process threshold for the crime of failing to pay a debt. Rather, the
standards courts use in determining whether someone’s failure to pay their
child support obligations should lead to incarceration are inconsistent, often
failing to rise to the “willful” standard required for revocation.

128. Appleman, supra note 17, at 1485 & n.17.
129. Id. at 1490.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1491.
132. OFF. JUDICIAL SERV., SUP. CT. OHIO, COLLECTION OF FINES AND COURT COSTS IN ADULT
TRIAL COURTS (2014), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf;
Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the
Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1761 (2010) (“[W]arrants may be issued, and
arrests and confinement may occur, solely due to nonpayment of legal debt.”); Ohio High Court Offers
Judges Fines, Fees Guidance, AKRON BEACON J./OHIO.COM (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:16 AM) (on file with
author); Editorial, Return of Debtors’ Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012), http:// www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/14/opinion/ return-of-debtors-prisons.html; Editorial, The New Debtors’ Prisons, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/opinion/06mon4.html; see also RACHEL L.
MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS
(2007), https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/default-source/restitution-toolkit/repaying_debts_full_report.pd
f?sfvrsn=2; Harris et al., supra note 132, at 1782–83 (reporting that “nearly one in four of our
respondents reported having served time in jail as a sanction for nonpayment”).
133. Birckhead, supra note 17, at 1634.
134. See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 17, at 1490–91.
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An obvious distinction exists between the legal standard required for
revoking a person’s probation or parole, or even pretrial release, after
failure to pay a criminal justice obligation and the range of legal standards
a state could set as the requisite mens rea for a criminal statute, such as for
the “crime” of failing to pay child support. But what is required for incarceration if one commits the “crime” of failure to pay child support is often
much less than what is required for incarceration due to a failure to pay a
criminal justice debt, an incongruous result.
An examination of state statutes governing the crime of failing to pay
child support reveals that states employ a range of mental states. Some
states do require a “willful” failure to pay in order to justify a conviction,135
but almost as many states have no mens rea requirement at all136 or require
that the parent’s failure to pay be “knowing.”137 Both the strict liability
standard and the “knowing” standard mean that a person can be convicted
of failing to pay child support either without any consideration of the
reasons for the person’s inability to pay, in violation of the spirit and
arguably the law of Bearden, or according to a standard far short of what
states require to incarcerate someone for a simple failure to pay a criminal
fine, fee, or other sentencing sanction postconviction.
To be clear, this author is not advocating for an approach that requires
all states to analyze a noncustodial parent’s ability to pay and allows a
finding of criminal guilt or incarceration only if the noncustodial parent’s
inability to pay is found to be “willful.” Even if all courts authorized a
criminal conviction only upon a finding of a “willful” failure to pay child
support, this practice would still seem to be in open violation of the
fundamental principle that courts regularly espouse: we are not a nation
135. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 14-6-101 (West 2016);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.06 (West 2016); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 16/15 (West 2009); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 10-203 (LexisNexis 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-3 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:24-5 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-15 (2017); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 853 (West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-2-1.1 (2002 & Supp. 2017); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 202 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.20.035 (West
2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-29 (LexisNexis 2014). Some states require the parent’s failure to be
“intentional.” ALA. CODE § 13A-13-4 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:75 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28706 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-16 (1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22 (West 2005 & Supp.
2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-3-101 (2017).
136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-401 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-304 (West 2012); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 726.5 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.165 (West 2004 & Supp. 2018); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-6-2 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-20 (2010) (“without just cause or excuse”); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.555 (2003) (“without lawful excuse”).
137. ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-5 (West 2012 & Supp.
2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.050 (LexisNexis 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 552
(2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.375 (West 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (West 2012 & Supp.
2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.020 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:4 (LexisNexis
2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-101 (2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (LexisNexis 2017).
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that incarcerates people for failing to pay their debts. But if the standard in
Bearden were to apply to cases of criminal nonsupport and if courts did set
“willfulness” as the requisite threshold, in light of how often courts manage
to skirt their constitutional obligations under Bearden, the results likely
would be no different in the context of the crime of nonsupport. “Willfulness” would be just a procedural hurdle to overcome through creative
maneuvering or an expansive interpretation of what constitutes a “willful”
failure to pay.
B. Criminal Prosecution as a Sanction for Poor Fatherhood
The creation of a new generation of fathers incarcerated in debtors’
prisons is only one troubling consequence of the law’s current approach to
child support obligations. Another significant problem with the child support system is that it is funded on the backs of parents, primarily fathers,
who are indigent and can barely support themselves. The system is set up
so that fathers with little to no income are helping to finance the
government’s child support enforcement system, due to the assignment of
support payments that poor and working-class custodial parents are
required to give. Thus, the government is seeking to collect child support
debt owed by fathers with little to no income who cannot pay what they
owe. If a father does not pay the debt, even when it is because he has
insufficient income on which to live regardless of the debt, the government
punishes him with criminal charges and likely incarceration, which often
leads to greater debt. The result is both that the child support system will
never be fully funded in a way that is beneficial for the custodial parent and
child, and poor fathers end up criminally sanctioned solely for not being
able to finance the government’s child support system.
Legislators tout, and society accepts, two primary motivations for our
current child support system: ensuring the health and well-being of children
and doing so without requiring the government to provide that financial
support, which is often pitched as protecting the government’s fiscal health
and well-being.138 First, the state desires to protect children by ensuring
their basic needs are met. A caretaker cannot purchase the basic necessities
for a child without money, and the biological parents are the first place to
which states look to provide those funds. Second, the state desires to
protect its own fiscal well-being. The state does not want to bear the financial responsibility for raising children whose parents either cannot or will
not provide for them financially. A closer examination of the federal child
support law belies this two-fold purpose while simultaneously revealing
138. See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 19, at 67–68.
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that neither aim is met by our current child support system. Children are
not better off, and, as suggested earlier, the government is operating at a net
loss.
1. The Child Support System as Child-Protective
Children are among the most vulnerable members of our society. An
appeal to the legislative and public conscience to help protect children and
ensure that they receive the most basic necessities is easy to make. Yet,
despite the repeated assertions by legislators and policymakers that the
child support system has a primary goal of protecting and supporting
children, the on-the-ground reality is quite different. The factors that have
been shown to make a significant difference in a child’s development and
achievement are multifaceted. Although those factors do include income
level, the evidence to date does not suggest that child support laws change
the income equation in a way that positively affects a child’s well-being.
Our current child support laws do not address or attempt to assist with all
the other relevant factors of a child’s well-being.
Among the most important determinants of a child’s development are a
combination of family structure, income level, and parental education.139
Each of these factors has a reverberating impact. Family structure plays a
key role in a child’s development and well-being. Children raised by
married parents have higher academic achievements; stay in school longer;
are less likely to use illegal substances and have contact with the police; are
less likely to have sex and bear children at an early age; have better
physical and mental health outcomes as adults; and earn more as adults
than children raised by either divorced parents140 or unmarried parents.141
By contrast, children raised by unmarried parents are more likely to show
negative behaviors, whether those parents are living together with the child
or not.142 Importantly, the marital status of the parents plays a much larger
role in determining the outcomes than whether the child is raised by a
single parent or in a two-parent family.143
Both income and parental education also play a significant role in a
child’s development, as these two factors tend to be related to family
structure.144 However, recent research suggests that income and parental
139. Huntington, supra note 35, at 196–202.
140. The data on outcomes for children of divorced parents is more nuanced than that for
children of unmarried parents. See id. at 196 n.165.
141. Id. at 196–97.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 197.
144. Id.
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education cannot account for all of the differences in outcomes between
children of married and unmarried parents, even though these differences
are significantly diminished when researchers control for poverty and
parental resources.145 On closer examination, other factors related to family
structure make the critical difference in outcomes. Specifically, family
instability and a parent having a child by a new partner both play influential
roles in child outcomes.146
Long-established research determined that children need a secure base
from which to learn about and explore the world around them. Secure
relationships in early childhood positively affect brain development and
academic achievement147 as well as behavior and emotional development.
When the relationship between parents is unstable, the instability affects
the parenting behavior of both parents, resulting in their child having more
difficulty gaining the attention and attachment they need for healthy
development.148
In the event either parent ends up with a new partner, particularly if
that parent and the new partner have a child together, that pairing again
affects parenting. If the mother ends up with a new partner, the father’s
involvement in his child’s life tends to diminish.149 If the mother has a child
by a new partner, she often experiences increased financial strain and less
support from her family and social network.150 If a father has a child by a
new partner, numerous factors contribute to greater odds that he will disengage from his previous children.151 This withdrawal regularly leads to
increased academic, emotional, and behavioral problems for the children
from his previous relationship(s).152
Paternal disengagement is a problem for children of divorced parents as
well as for those whose parents never married. Almost 60% of children of
divorced or separated parents see their fathers a few times a year or less,
and children from nonmarital relationships see their fathers even more
rarely.153 Studies have found that a father’s absence doubles the likelihood
of a child’s incarceration, even accounting for parental education, family
income, race, and other factors.154 Absent fathers can lead a child to have
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
(2006).
154.

Id. at 197–98.
Id. at 198–202.
Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 199–200.
Id.
Id. at 200–01
Id. at 201.
Maldonado, supra note 30, at 998–99.
Solangel Maldonado, Recidivism and Paternal Engagement, 40 FAMILY L.Q. 191, 194
Id. at 194–95.
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increased mental health issues, diminished levels of school achievement,
disproportionate representation in the juvenile justice system, and greater
risk of adolescent pregnancy.155 When fathers positively engage with their
children, they can play important roles in the lives and successes of their
children.156 Children who have regular contact with their fathers have better
academic, social, and emotional outcomes.157
On the surface, child support payments made by the noncustodial
parent to the custodial parent should help address one factor that
significantly impacts child well-being: income. Yet, as we know from the
previous Part, the fathers who owe the most child support to the mothers
who most need it are the ones with the least ability to pay it. As a result,
child support orders have the presumably unintended result of leading to
increased paternal disengagement. Although child support laws operate
relatively effectively for divorcing parents, as most divorced custodial
parents receive full or partial payment of child support obligations,158 for
unmarried parents, child support often is “a source of tremendous acrimony
and divisiveness.”159 Divorcing parents who are “elite, college-educated
couples seek relatively egalitarian partnerships and negotiate under a
default rule of shared parenting.”160 By contrast, 45% of unmarried fathers
have dropped out of high school and 42% have been incarcerated at some
point, both factors that decrease their ability to pay.161
The result is that “stringent child support enforcement” discourages
poor fathers from being involved in their child’s life.162 As one scholar has
noted, “the system imposes unrealistic expectations, angering mothers, who
are annoyed that fathers are not meeting their obligations, and fathers, who
are frustrated by the onerous debt.”163 Rather than encouraging a father’s
presence in his child’s life, child support enforcement pushes poor fathers
away from their children.164 Child support laws reinforce a message that a
father’s only worth to his child is financial: “[D]efining nonresident
155. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., A SHARED SENTENCE: THE DEVASTATING TOLL OF PARENTAL
INCARCERATION ON KIDS, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 3 (2016); Kohn, supra note 19, at 85–86.
156. Kohn, supra note 19, at 86.
157. Maldonado, supra note 153, at 194.
158. Huntington, supra note 35, at 206.
159. Id. at 206–07; see also HASDAY, supra note 56, at 206–07 (“[Child support statutes] created
reasons to stop paying child support . . . . The law conclusively presumed that support paid for one child
would also be used to support that child’s co-resident full or half-siblings, even if those siblings were
biologically unrelated and legally unconnected to the person paying the support. A noncustodial parent
who did not want to support someone else’s children might be disinclined to keep paying support.”).
160. Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2296.
161. Huntington, supra note 35, at 206–07.
162. Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2296; see also Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1012.
163. Huntington, supra note 35, at 206.
164. Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1014.
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fathers’ ‘responsibility solely in terms of cash support . . . [makes] it more
difficult for [them] to offer inputs of time or emotional effort in their place,
contributing to paternal disengagement.’”165 Not surprisingly, studies have
found a correlation between the frequency of paternal contact and the
payment of child support.166
The relationship between children and their fathers becomes even more
strained if they are incarcerated due to the failure to pay child support debt.
Numerous studies document the myriad barriers children encounter in
attempting to continue a relationship with an incarcerated parent. Many
inmates are incarcerated at facilities far from home in locations largely
inaccessible by public transportation.167 If a child is able to arrange a visit,
most visits are regulated. Other studies detail the negative effects of a
parent’s incarceration on a child’s well-being.168 “[A] study of fathers in
prison” found “that almost 42% of [those] who [did] not live[] with their
child[] prior to incarceration” only “had contact with their child[]” once a
month or less while incarcerated.169 For children who want a relationship
with their father, paternal interactions have a “significant positive emotional impact.”170
If the welfare of children was truly the concern, the child support
system would be designed to encourage paternal involvement, not just
paternal income. To encourage parental involvement, a child-centered
support system would place a value on the very important nonmonetary
contributions a noncustodial parent can, and often does, make in a child’s
life.171 Laws and regulations would focus on helping those fathers who
make below the poverty threshold attain job skills, education, and
employment so they become better equipped to provide financial support.172 If the child support system were more flexible in looking at a
noncustodial parent’s contributions and providing methods of helping that
parent obtain stable work, these two factors could go far toward eliminating
165. Id. at 1013 (alteration in original) (citing Paula England & Nance Folbre, Involving Dads:
Parental Bargaining and Family Well-Being, in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT 387, 402
(Catherine S. Taims-LeMonda & Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002)).
166. Id. at 998.
167. Dennis, supra note 20, at 328.
168. Id. at 328–29; Kohn, supra note 19, at 77.
169. Kohn, supra note 19, at 77.
170. Id. at 85.
171. Id. at 53–54.
172. Brito, supra note 19, at 633; Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1019–20. Although programs
aimed at increasing the amount of child support a father pays by helping them obtain job training and
skills have not necessarily led to increases in employment rates or child support payments in the past,
the failures have likely been linked to the program’s focus. Id. at 1019–21. These programs have still
been aimed at collecting child support, not encouraging and facilitating paternal involvement. Id. at
1021–22.
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many of the barriers to paying child support.
2. The Child Support System’s Fiscal Responsibility?
In addition to the welfare of children, legislatures have long touted the
government’s financial well-being as motivation for our current child
support system’s setup. Legislators desire to keep state and local
governments from having to support children whose custodial parent is
unable to support herself and her children. As a result, legislatures require
noncustodial parents to reimburse the state for any “welfare” expenditures
it makes to the custodial parent. If a custodial parent does not receive state
assistance, the noncustodial parent’s child support payment goes to the
custodial parent. But if she does receive state assistance, the noncustodial
parent’s payment goes directly to the state and federal governments, who
subsidize the state child support systems, as reimbursement. Accessible
data establishing what percentage of noncustodial parents’ payments go
directly to the state and federal governments and what percentage is passed
on to custodial parents is lacking.
On the surface, a recent infographic from the Office of Child Support
Enforcement (OCSE) seems to provide this data.173 According to that
infographic, 95% of child support collected in fiscal year 2016 went
directly to families, with 5% reimbursing public assistance dollars.174
OCSE also highlights the cost-effectiveness of the child support program.
According to the infographic, for every $1 spent on administering the child
support program, $5.33 was collected.175
On further examination, these statistics appear somewhat misleading.
The way the data is presented makes it difficult to tell where a noncustodial
parent’s money paid as “child support” is actually going. The most recent
OCSE annual report suggests that only a very small percentage—less than
5%—of child support and foster care payments is going to reimburse the
state and federal government for the financial assistance they provide to
those in need.176 On closer inspection, and with the caveats mentioned in

173. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, 2016 CHILD SUPPORT: MORE MONEY FOR FAMILIES
(2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/2016_preliminary_report_infographic.
pdf.
174. Id.
175. Id. Data from fiscal year 2017 has a slightly lower cost-effectiveness ratio of $5.15. OFFICE
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, PRELIMINARY REPORT FY 2017, at 6 tbl.P-1 (2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov
/sites/default/files/programs/css/fy_2017_preliminary_data_report.pdf.
176. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 6 tbl.P-1 (dividing total assistance
reimbursement from FY 2017—$1,184,766,692—by the payments made to families or foster care that
passed through to families during the same year—$26,725,120,378); id. at 16 tbl.P-11 (noting total
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previous paragraphs related to the difficulty of deciphering the data, the
numbers suggest that 67% of collections disbursed on behalf of those
children who are currently receiving child support assistance goes toward
reimbursing the state and federal governments for the “welfare assistance”
they have provided to those children.177 A much smaller percentage—8%—
of collections received and then disbursed on behalf of children who
formerly received state assistance goes to reimburse the government,178
thereby skewing the data, since these two categories are combined.179
Approximately 55% of the collections goes to reimburse the federal
government, and approximately 45% remains with the state.180
The cost-effectiveness ratio is similarly problematic. The costeffectiveness ratio of $5.33 collected for every $1 spent is reached by
dividing collections by expenditures.181 But how OCSE defines “collecdistributed TANF collections of $1,348,334,734, which, according to an email to the author from
OCSE, is the amount of reimbursement to the state and federal government).
177. Id. at 6 tbl.P-1 (dividing current assistance collections disbursed as assistance reimbursement from FY 2017—$477,348,405—by the total current assistance collections disbursed from the
same year—$710,521,048). The caveat is that foster care collections and payments are not separated
out, except in one stand-alone table, see id. at 17 tbl.P-12, making it unclear what percentage of these
payments may be reimbursing states and the federal government for foster care maintenance payments,
see id. at 6 tbl.P-1 & n.3. Total foster care collections distributed amounted to $69,604,601. Id. at 17
tbl.P-12.
178. Id. at 6 tbl.P-1 (dividing assistance reimbursement of former assistance collections by
classification from FY 2017—$707,418,287—by the total former assistance collections from the same
year—$8,614,626,411).
179. The much smaller percentage of collections on behalf of children who formerly received
assistance goes toward arrearages and seems largely to be distributed directly to the custodial parents.
Why is not abundantly clear. The data is additionally skewed because it includes Medicaid payments
and other payments made to families who never received state assistance at all. See id. It is still unclear
to this author, however, how the authors of the report arrive at the conclusion that 95% of payments go
to families in light of the 67% and 8% figures in the data found elsewhere in the table. OCSE indicated
that it calculated the 5% by dividing the total payments to families (which includes child support,
Medicaid, foster care, and medical support payments)—$27,386,940,389—by the total distributed
collections—$28,625,294,083—to arrive at the conclusion that 95% of distributed child support payments go to families. See id. at 8 tbl.P-3. But some significant portion of the money that is going to
families is for Medicaid, medical support, and foster care, not as child support in the sense discussed in
this Article. See id. Additionally, almost 40% of the amount going to custodial parents as child support
is money where the government has not ever provided welfare assistance to the parent or child. Id. at 6
tbl.P-1.
180. Id. (dividing state and federal shares by the amount of total assistance reimbursement from
FY 2017).
181. Id. at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting in the sources section at the bottom of the page the formula used to
calculate the cost-effectiveness ratio); see also U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS
FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-34, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM QUARTERLY
COLLECTION REPORT 4 (2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/form_ocse_34
_final_instructions.pdf; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF
FORM OCSE-396, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT 6–7
(2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/form_ocse_396_final_instructions.pdf.
The ratio here is the 2016 ratio in order to stay consistent with the aforementioned infographic. The
2017 cost-effectiveness ratio is $5.15. OFFICE CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 174, at 41 tbl.P-36.
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tions” and “expenditures” is critical. The “collections” figure includes
collections that go to reimburse states and the federal government for the
amount they are spending on TANF and foster care benefits;182 in other
words, part of the collection is simply going back to the states and federal
government to fund the child support program, not to the custodial parents
as one might suppose. As already indicated, 55% of child support payments
received as reimbursement goes to the federal government.
The “collections” figure also includes almost $11 billion received and
distributed on behalf of children who are not receiving and have not
received any state assistance.183 In other words, this $11 billion might have
been paid without the state ever getting involved. Assumedly, many of
these payments were made by middle- and upper-class parents with steady
income to a similarly situated former spouse pursuant to divorce-related
custody and support agreements. Many of these contributions are voluntarily made.184 As a result, at least some portion of these individuals does
not benefit from the state-run child support program, as they may not need
any involvement from the state to facilitate the making of these payments.
The “collections” number is also somewhat misleading as it does not
include money received from the federal government that states use to help
pay for the child support system: “[t]he child support [system] is a federal
matching grant program under which state and local governments must
spend money in order to receive federal funding.”185 For every $1 a state
spends, it receives $0.66 from the federal government.186 The federal
government pays a substantial share of the states’ administrative expen-

182. Part 1, line 8 of OCSE Form 34 adds up the total collections distributed in lines 7a through
7f, which includes, in line 7b, “[c]ollections [d]istributed [a]s [a]ssistance [r]eimbursement.” OFFICE
CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting in the sources section at the bottom of the
page that part 1, line 8, is part of the numerator in the equation); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-34, supra note 181, at 9–10.
183. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 6 tbl.P-1 (noting $10,932,255,293 of
distributed collections in the category of “never assistance,” defined as indicated); id. at 41 tbl.P-36
(indicating sources for collections numerator at the bottom of the page); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-34, supra note 181, at 4 (giving definition of
“never assistance”).
184. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF
FORM OCSE-157: THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL DATA REPORT 20 (2016),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/omb_0970_0177_instructions.pdf (noting in instruction
for line 25 that “[v]oluntary payments are considered current support and must be reported here, even
though there is no order to require payment”).
185. Elaine Sorensen & Melody Morales, Child Support Funding: 2008–2016, OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENF’T (May 2, 2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/ocsedatablog/2017/05/child-support-pro
gram-funding-2008-2016.
186. Id.
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ditures—approximately $3.5 billion annually.187 But the money that the
state collects from the federal government is not included in the “collections” part of the equation; the term only accounts for money collected
from noncustodial parents.
The federal government operates an incentive system. Under Title IVD of the Social Security Act, states can retain a portion of their child
support collections (rather than returning them to the federal government)
based on their performance in five areas: “establishment of paternit[y],
establishment of child support orders, collections on current child support
due, collection[s] on past child support due . . . and cost effectiveness.”188
An annual determination is made based on each state’s performance in
these areas.189
Both states’ expenditures and the federal government’s expenditures
are included in the “expenditure” denominator of the cost-effectiveness
ratio.190 The total “expenditures” in the ratio include funds the federal
government provides directly to the states through this incentive-based
program,191 even though the “collections” part of the ratio does not also
factor in those payments. For FY 2016 and 2017, only “estimated” incentive payments are documented; for the three previous years—FY 2013
through FY 2015—the actual amount of the incentive payments the federal
government made to the states is available.192 In FY 2017, the estimated
federal incentive payments totaled more than $490 million, with the
amount per state ranging from $0 in Hawaii, Nevada, District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico to $72 million provided in Texas.193 In the most recent
187. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 48–50 tbls.P-43, P-44, P-45; U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-396, supra note
181, at 2 (definitions section).
188. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS
AND THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE (1997), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/child-support-incentivefunding.
189. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, app. at 120–26 (laying out the formulas
for how incentive payments are determined).
190. Id. at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting the sources used in calculating the cost-effectiveness ratio, which
only include line 7, columns A & C from OCSE form 396, which are the total expenditures); U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-396, supra note
181, at 4–7.
191. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 41 tbl.P-36 (noting in the sources
section at the bottom of the page that line 7 of OCSE Form 396 is the primary source of the
denominator, which includes federal incentive payments); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF FORM OCSE-396, supra note 181, at 4–7. The expenditures
denominator includes “IV-D Administrative Expenditures Made Using Funds Received as Incentive
Payments.” Id. at 4. As OCSE’s instructions accompanying the form note, this category includes
“[a]dministrative expenditures and estimates using incentive payment funds. Each State is required to
spend the funds it received as annual incentive payments to carry out title IV-D program activities.” Id.
192. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 42–43 tbl.P-37, tbl.P-38.
193. Id. at 42 tbl.P-37.
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years, the federal government provided more money than anticipated in the
estimates.194 In 2013, for example, the estimated incentive payments
amounted to about $448 million, but the actual payments totaled $538
million.195 In FY 2015, the most recent year of available data, states
anticipated receiving a little over $481 million in federal incentive
payments, but actually received $556 million.196 As a result, one has reason
to believe that the actual incentive payments made in FY 2017 will be
substantially above the $492 million anticipated for that year.
As it stands, much of the child support system is circular, with the
federal government providing funding, via the states, to poor custodial
parents on behalf of their children, and poor noncustodial parents being
ordered to reimburse the state and federal governments for those programs.
If the custodial parents are unable to do so, the government then seeks to
punish and possibly incarcerate them. That hardly seems to be a costefficient program, nor does it appear to be an effective one. The costeffectiveness ratio would be quite different if one removed the federal
government’s substantial support from the equation and if one accounted
specifically for the money that went directly to the custodial parents raising
the children at issue. As it is, the cost-effectiveness ratio appears skewed.
The ratio does not seem to adequately reflect either how much the state and
federal governments are spending on the system or how much is actually
going to the custodial parent rather than to the government to offset the
costs of the state assistance it is providing.
Additionally, the cost of incarceration for those who are punished with
jail or prison time for failing to pay is one extraordinary cost to states that
is not accounted for in the cost-effectiveness ratio. The average annual cost
of incarcerating someone in the federal system is $31,977.65.197 As with
the amount spent on maintaining the child support system, the amount
states spend on incarceration varies widely. The average state cost nationwide is $33,274 annually, with “a low of $14,780 in Alabama” and “a high
of $69,355 in New York.”198 California, at the high end, spends more than
$8 billion per year on prison costs, whereas North Dakota, at the low end,

194. Compare id., with id. at 43 tbl.P-38.
195. Compare id. at 42 tbl.P-37, with id. at 43 tbl.P-38.
196. Compare id. at 42 tbl.P-37, with id. at 43 tbl.P-38.
197. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,957 (July 19,
2016). Those who have interstate child support orders can be charged federally now.
198. VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, PRISON SPENDING IN 2015 (2017), https://www.vera.org/publ
ications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/priceof-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prison-spending. Eight states, primarily northeastern, had an
annual average cost of more than $50,000 per inmate, whereas eighteen states, primarily southern, spent
less than $25,000 a year. Id. Nineteen states averaged between $25,000 and $50,000 annually. Id.
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spends $65 million.199 Obviously, these costs cover the incarceration of
many individuals who are not detained on the basis of their failure to pay
child support, but they include the approximately 25% of individuals
incarcerated who have outstanding child support obligations at the time of
their incarceration.200 Because accurate numbers regarding how many
individuals are incarcerated solely for failing to pay child support are not
available, assessing how much the average cost-effectiveness of the child
support system would be, factoring in the annual costs of incarceration for
those individuals, is impossible.201
Legislators are no doubt sincere when they indicate a concern about the
state having to support children whose parents are unable to do so. Notable
scholars have documented this push toward privatizing family support.202
But requiring men who make little or no income to subsidize the
government’s child support program—and face criminal charges and incarceration if they cannot do so—does not provide a cost-efficient or effective
method for minimizing the government’s costs.
III. CRIMINALIZING POOR FATHERHOOD
If the child support system fails to effectively enhance children’s wellbeing and fails to do so in a cost-effective manner, what is the motivation
for maintaining such a system? Why criminally sanction and incarcerate a
man who makes little to no income for not being able to pay either a private
or public debt? Our society seeks to deter “irresponsible sex” among
heterosexuals who cannot afford to support children and to punish those
who failed to be deterred. Moral condemnation of and a desire to stigmatize
poor, and often minority, fathers for making that reproductive choice to
bear children they cannot financially support is at the heart of the
criminalization of a father’s failure to pay child support. Although mothers
are not immune, legally or otherwise, from this moral judgment and
condemnation, the stigmatization of mothers manifests largely in other

199. Id.
200. See supra note 8.
201. Unfortunately, neither the federal nor state criminal justice systems seem to have information readily available regarding the cost-effectiveness of their prisons and jails, as many are just starting
to gather the necessary data to conduct such analysis. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & JOSHUA
RINALDI, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUSTICE POLICY TOOLKIT 2, 4 (2014);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-8, COST OF PRISONS: BUREAU OF PRISONS NEEDS
BETTER DATA TO ASSESS ALTERNATIVES FOR ACQUIRING LOW AND MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES
10–18 (2007).
202. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 31, at 360–64; Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of
Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 1866–69 (2014). See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004).
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ways, some of which have been critically explored by distinguished
scholars.203 The child support system is a primary area where this disdain
of poor fathers is evident.204 Fatherhood is largely defined by a societal
expectation of financial support—by an image of the father as “breadwinner.” If a father fails to live up to that expectation, our society punishes
him for bringing a child into the world and being unable to financially
support her.
A. The Use of Criminal Enforcement Mechanisms
In examining how we have come to rely on criminal law to address a
father’s failure to pay his outstanding child support debt, whether owed to
the child’s mother or to the state as reimbursement, one has to wonder why
we do not simply use the civil law mechanisms that are available to address
this dilemma. After all, the civil system usually is where parties litigate
financial obligations, liabilities, and debts, generally without resort to
incarceration.205 This is not to suggest that this author finds incarceration
pursuant to a civil contempt remedy a satisfactory mechanism for addressing the needs of families with little to no income, but rather, to raise the
question of why an additional layer of criminal processes is utilized at all
when civil processes with similar sanctions are available. By invoking the
criminal justice system, the state implicates an entirely different set of
norms and emphases and raises a distinct set of questions, as will be
discussed further below.
All states have civil enforcement mechanisms that they can and do use
to encourage noncustodial parents to pay. No available data suggests that
civil methods of enforcing child support obligations are any less effective
than criminal mechanisms at protecting state coffers and looking after the
well-being of a child. Perhaps if evidence showed that the use of criminal

203. See, e.g., KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY
AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (2011); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997) [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK
BODY]; DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) [hereinafter
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1657 (2008); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938 (1997).
204. Other noteworthy scholars have explored additional manifestations of this judgment. See,
e.g., Antognini, supra note 38; Maldonado, supra note 30; Mayeri, supra note 38.
205. The obvious exceptions here are detention pursuant to a civil contempt order or through
nominally civil commitment. Although civil law allows for incarceration through civil contempt, its
regular use in the child support context seems to be merely an end-run around providing the legal
protections required before incarceration is permitted in the criminal context. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (holding right to
counsel required before someone could be imprisoned for an offense); cf. Kohn, supra note 19, at 70–
72.
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sanctions produced increased numbers of people paying child support obligations, the argument that states use criminal sanctions because they are
more effective might be compelling. But because states and the federal
government do not collect data documenting the effectiveness of either
civil or criminal enforcement mechanisms in getting delinquent parents to
pay,206 we have no evidence that subjecting a father who does not pay his
child support obligations to the strictures of the criminal justice system is
either effective as a general matter or more effective than the use of civil
sanctions.207
In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Incarceration is a sanction
available through civil contempt proceedings.208 However, if a parent is
charged with the crime of failure to pay and the parent is deemed indigent,
in most instances the state must provide counsel for the parent at an
additional cost to the state.209 If the state brings a civil contempt action
against the parent, no lawyer—and no additional cost—is required. 210
If criminal law is no more effective than civil law at getting fathers to
pay their child support obligations, and if incarceration is available as a
civil sanction with no additional cost for a lawyer, what is it that the
criminal law provides to make it a worthwhile option for states? Criminal
charges communicate a message of deterrence regarding unprotected
heterosexual sex and moral condemnation for those who disregard that
message. Regarding fathers, we signal quite clearly our moral condemnation of men who engage in unprotected sex, father a child, and then are
unable to provide financially for that child.211 Criminalization allows us to
206. The Office of Child Support Enforcement documents how much is paid, how many people
owe, and many other aspects of child support payments, see supra note 175, but this author has not
found any source documenting to what degree and how often, and in what amounts, civil or criminal
enforcement mechanisms lead noncustodial parents to pay when they previously did not. Likewise, she
could find no data comparing the relative effectiveness of the two sanctions.
207. As previously mentioned, there is simply a lack of data on the number of people
incarcerated for failure to pay child support, both on the civil and criminal sides. As a result, we
likewise have no information about whether incarceration pursuant to civil contempt orders is effective
in getting noncustodial parents to pay.
208. In at least one state, child support obligors incarcerated pursuant to civil contempt
proceedings constitute between 13% and 16% of the jail population. Brito, supra note 19, at 618.
Notably, however, when states seek to enforce child support obligations through the civil contempt
system, the owing parent does not have the right to counsel, see Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448–
49 (2011), and the period of confinement is not limited by statute as it is on the criminal side.
209. In the states where failure to pay is a felony charge, indigent defendants always have the
right to appointed counsel. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–
45 (1963); cf. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002). Although those facing misdemeanor
charges only have the right to counsel if the judge is going to impose a period of incarceration, as a
matter of course in most places, courts appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases as well.
210. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 448–49.
211. See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the
Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 17 (1990).
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mark poor fathers with the stigma of a criminal conviction for engaging in
this behavior.
Deterrence is one of the primary theories on which criminal law relies
to justify punishment—both general deterrence and specific deterrence.
Although not usually acknowledged as a motivation for criminalizing the
nonpayment of a child support obligation, deterring people with little to no
income from engaging in (unprotected) heterosexual sex is an underacknowledged driver of our current child support system. Legislators and
judges seek to deter what they view as “irresponsible sex,” even if such sex
is engaged in by two people who are in a committed relationship at the
time, by regulating the consequences of unprotected sex among those with
little to no income. Criminalizing the failure to pay child support aims to
deter unmarried straight individuals with little income from having children
by making the financial, liberty, and stigma costs of such conduct sufficiently high that potential parents will be dissuaded from engaging in the
conduct altogether.
To be clear, this focus on deterrence is aimed at fathers who have little
or no income, as lawmakers seem to presume that fathers with steady jobs
and comfortable assets will more securely assume the risk of their sexual
activity and the possible financial obligation of supporting a child that
might come from such a risk. This “bifurcation between the legal treatment
of poor families and other families”212 is not unique to the child support
context.213 Although “[c]ourts and legislatures regulating the rights and
responsibilities of family members generally stress the government’s
interests in protecting familial privacy, deferring to parental judgment, and
reducing disruption of family relationships[,] . . . legal authorities embrace
diametrically opposed norms in regulating poor families.”214 Jill Hasday
observes, “Family law for the poor is explicitly premised on scrutiny of
family life, suspicion of parental judgment, and enthusiastic interference in
family relations.”215 Regulation and interference in the lives of parents of
lesser economic means is not limited to the civil or family law context. In
fact, as numerous scholars have observed, legislators and courts regularly

212. HASDAY, supra note 56, at 198.
213. See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 203; ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 203;
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 203; Wendy Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women,
Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317 (2014); Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 268 (2010).
214. HASDAY, supra note 56, at 196.
215. Id.; see also State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 216, 219 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he majority imbues a fundamental liberty interest [the right to have children] with a
sliding scale of wealth.”); ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 203.
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engage in highly invasive regulation of poor individuals under the ambit of
criminal law as well.216
To the extent that one doubts the deterrence rationale invoked by
criminalizing the failure to pay child support, a Wisconsin case epitomizes
the lengths to which courts will go to deter reproduction by potential
parents who may not have the money to support a child.217 David Oakley
was convicted of the crime of intentionally failing to pay child support for
his nine children—although there was some dispute about whether he had
the ability to pay, according to the dissent.218 The court imposed as a
condition of probation the requirement that he not have any other children
“unless he demonstrate[d] that he had the ability to support them and that
he [was] supporting the children he already had.”219 Oakley appealed, but
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the condition because he “could have
been imprisoned for six years, which would have eliminated his right to
procreate altogether during those six years”; therefore, the court found, a
probation condition that he “avoid having another child” did not infringe on
his fundamental constitutional “right to procreate.”220 Rather, it facilitated
probation’s goal of rehabilitating Mr. Oakley221 and provided “his child
victims and any future child victims with some measure of protection from
any of Oakley’s future acts that may violate the law.”222 In other words,
legally prohibiting Mr. Oakley from engaging in unprotected sexual activity is a permissible method of specifically deterring Mr. Oakley from
creating “any future child victims” that he might be unable to financially

216. See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 203; KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011); ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY,
supra note 203; ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 203, at 200–20; Kaaryn Gustafson,
Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297
(2013); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, Criminal Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009); Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing Pregnancy, 92 IND. L.J. 947 (2017); see
also Kate Weisburd, Sentenced to Surveillance (Oct. 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
217. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 200.
218. Id. at 217–18 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“The [circuit] court explained that ‘it would always
be a struggle to support these children and in truth [Oakley] could not reasonably be expected to fully
support them. . . . [Y]ou know and I know . . . [y]ou’re going to struggle to make 25 or 30 [thousand
dollars a year]. And by the time you take care of your taxes and your social security, there isn’t a whole
lot to go around, and then you’ve got to ship it out to various children.’”).
219. Id. at 203 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 201–02.
221. Id. at 205–07.
222. Id. at 209.
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support.223 This method of deterrence, the court seems to indicate, is the
price of pleasure.224
As the dissent noted, “[t]he majority’s decision allows . . . the birth of a
child to carry criminal sanctions,” making it “the only court in the country
to declare constitutional a condition that limits a probationer’s right to
procreate based on his financial ability to support his children.”225 Although the dissent is technically correct, the majority’s decision only goes a
step beyond what most laws already encourage, merely taking our approach
to child support obligations to its logical conclusion. Child support laws
discourage people from procreating based on their financial ability to
support their children; Oakley takes the further step of prohibiting a father
from procreating based on his limited financial income. The outcome in
Oakley can be justified and distinguished from what most other courts do
because the prohibition was imposed as part of a criminal sentence: it was
permissible because “convicted individuals do not enjoy the same degree of
liberty as citizens who have not violated the law.”226 But despite its
distinguishing features, the result in Oakley should not be a surprise, as it
simply represents the ultimate realization of a criminal-law-based deterrent
approach.
Oakley illustrates the type of deterrence permissible under a criminal
regime, which would be unavailable under a civil system. The curtailment
of rights seen in Oakley is permissible only after someone has been convicted of a crime, even the crime of failing to pay child support. The result
we see in Oakley would be much harder, if not impossible, for courts to
accept in a civil or family law setting. Likewise, the Oakley court relies on
rehabilitation, another theory of punishment invoked primarily in the
criminal context. Most of the reasons proffered by the majority in support
of this ultimate form of deterrence rely on the sanction’s presence in the
criminal system.
Deterrence is not the only motivation for placing child support enforcement under the ambit of criminal law. Criminal convictions are
intended to convey moral condemnation and judgment. As a result, criminalizing the reproductive decisions of poor fathers carries significant
consequences. If a poor father is convicted for engaging in careless sex that
resulted in a child he is unable to financially support, he faces not only
incarceration but also the fairly unshakeable lifelong stigma of a criminal
223. See id.
224. See id. Thank you to Susan Appleton for suggesting this word choice. Shari Motro has used
the phrase to make a somewhat different point in her article by the same name. See Shari Motro, The
Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. LAW. REV. 917 (2010). I wish to credit her also with this terminology.
225. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 208 (majority opinion).
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conviction. We have deemed that to be an appropriate response because of
our moral judgments and beliefs about sex and fatherhood.
As a result, fathers, whose only crime is failing to financially support
the mother of their child or to reimburse the state for doing so, face lifelong
condemnation. The stigma associated with having a criminal conviction is a
punishment that usually lasts much longer than the more palpable
deprivations of incarceration, parole, or probation. Being branded a
“criminal” carries broad, indefinite, and quantifiable ramifications.227
Although judgment and commitment orders do not articulate this aspect of
punishment in their official documentation of a person’s criminal sentence,
a person with a criminal conviction continues to be both legally and practically “deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen”228 long after his
criminal sentence ends. Those additional, often life-long deprivations may
be tangible deprivations, such as continued disenfranchisement and the
removal of employment opportunities otherwise available,229 or intangible,
such as the denial of marital relationships that otherwise might have been
pursued but for the other’s views of the defendant’s criminal conviction,230
diminishment of a person’s mental and physical health because of the emotional and physical toll of incarceration, and the stigma of having been
identified and sanctioned as a “criminal.”231 For most, these life-long
deprivations are every bit as real a part of the punishment as the technical
sentence imposed by a judge in a criminal case.
Most fathers who are convicted and sentenced for failing to pay child

227. See, e.g., Rasmusen, supra note 15; cf. Bronsteen et al., supra note 15, at 1049–55
(discussing long-term effects of prison on well-being).
228. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 10 (1955).
229. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 32–35 (2007); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 120–25
(2006); Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQ.
410, 412–13 (2001). Tennessee is the only state that continues to disenfranchise noncustodial parents
who fail to pay their child support obligations. Policy Briefing, CTR. FOR FAM. POL’Y & PRAC., Oct.
2012, at 2.
230. WESTERN, supra note 229, at 146–47; Beth M. Huebner, The Effect of Incarceration on
Marriage and Work over the Life Course, 22 JUST. Q. 281, 296 (2005); Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce
Western, Incarceration and the Formation and Stability of Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
721, 721 (2005); Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of
Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 117 (2007); see also VICTOR TADROS, THE
ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 30 (2011) (“[Punishment] destroys and
hinders the development of relationships between the offender and his family and friends, many of
whom will feel ashamed and distressed at the punishment of the offender.”).
231. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious Disease, and Other
Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56, 57 (2008); Michael Massoglia,
Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 275, 296 (2008);
Schnittker & John, supra note 230, at 125. The decline in physical health begins once someone serves a
period of incarceration of twelve months and continues beyond their release from prison. Massoglia,
Incarceration as Exposure, supra note 231, at 67 app.

3 LOLLAR 125-181 (DO NOT DELETE)

166

10/17/2018 10:52 AM

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1:125

support are ordered to pay the outstanding debt as part of their criminal
sentence. At this point, the father’s obligation to pay child support stems
from both an administrative or court order based on paternity and now a
criminal court order requiring the father to pay the child support as a
condition of his sentence. A restitution debt imposed as part of a criminal
sentence is visibly marked as a criminal punishment by its presence on a
judge’s final disposition order, and it in turn continues to mark the person
owing restitution as a “criminal.” Both a child support order and a criminal
restitution order can remain outstanding even after every other aspect of a
criminal sentence has been completed. Additionally, either order alone can
be the source of a person’s continued disenfranchisement or failure to
obtain certain employment opportunities. Both debts are life-long, as
neither is dischargeable in bankruptcy.232 A child support order is a
continuing, weighty consequence bearing down on the convicted defendant
and depriving him of “some of the normal rights of . . . citizen[s].”233
B. The Crime of Being a Poor Father
Once we realize that the only explanations for our current child support
system are deterrence, moral condemnation, and stigma of the reproductive
decisions of primarily poor fathers who fail to financially provide for their
children or who fail to reimburse the state for doing so, the question
becomes how? How did we get to a place as a society where not paying
child support is worthy of this level of condemnation and sanction? The
ostensible answer is always the child’s welfare: we punish fathers because
we care about the well-being of the child. Yet, as we have seen, if child
welfare were truly the concern, our focus would not be on increasing child
support payments but on facilitating the child’s relationship with her father
and increasing state support for all members of the child’s family.
Although child welfare should be at the heart of our concern, it is not.
Rather, we punish fathers because they fail to fit the traditional, stereotypical image of a white, able-bodied, upper-middle-class father. Very few
families conform to this image, yet our laws remain wedded to this deeply
entrenched role—so much so that we are willing to punish men who do not
conform.
Underlying our society’s approach to child support obligations are
strong gender-, class-, and race-based norms. As Laurie Kohn explains,
232. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, and Beyond,
84 WASH. U.L. REV. 1861, 1881–83 (2006); see also, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986)
(holding that criminal restitution orders are not dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings); In
re Verola, 336 B.R. 547, 550–52 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (same).
233. See Rawls, supra note 228, at 10.

3 LOLLAR 125-181 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

Criminalizing (Poor) Fatherhood

10/17/2018 10:52 AM

167

“[t]he legal system expresses the clear message that the role of a father is to
provide for his children financially, and in fulfilling or failing in that role, a
father’s value to his children is determined.”234 When fathers fail to fulfill
that role, they are portrayed as a “deadbeat dad” who is irresponsible at
best, ill-intentioned and deserving of scorn at worst. If a father is too poor
to pay, people say, “He should have thought about that before getting
someone pregnant.” As with all criminal justice interventions in this era,
men of color, particularly African-American men, are disproportionately
affected by the decision to treat the failure to pay child support as a crime.
Throughout our country’s history, “welfare policy has distinguished
between people presumed able to work, and those presumed unable.”235 As
one state court said in reference to a defendant whose unemployment led to
incarceration, he, like any able-bodied adult, should be able to “get a job
flipping hamburgers at MacDonald’s [sic].”236 Able-bodied men are
“treated as unworthy of assistance” and punished if they do not work.237
Able-bodied fathers of no and low income are not only seen as unworthy of
public assistance, they are seen as the cause of the poverty experienced by
women with children.238
The deep legacy of the belief that any man can pull himself up by his
bootstraps in this country has led many to believe that an able-bodied
man’s unemployment must be voluntary—some form of laziness.239 If ablebodied fathers of limited economic means are the cause of mass poverty,
they also are the potential cure. If they only would go to work and provide
for their families, poverty would be greatly reduced and child support debts
would be eliminated. In short, the law places both “the burden and
responsibility of poverty squarely on the backs of fathers.”240
Many men embrace this gender role and are ashamed of their seeming
inability to rise out of their financial circumstances and “man up.” One
study of low-income African-American men found a significant number
believe “real men are responsible to provide for themselves and their families.”241 Yet many of these men were unable to provide for their families.242
“African American fathers who [do] not live with their children [are] more
234. Kohn, supra note 19, at 53.
235. Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 903 (2013) (quoting Sylvia A.
Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53
(1983)).
236. Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 63 (Cal. 1998).
237. Hatcher, supra note 235, at 902–03.
238. Id. at 905, 907.
239. Id. at 905.
240. Id. at 907.
241. Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221, 258 (2015).
242. Id.
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likely to” be involved in their children’s lives than white or Latino
fathers.243 But that role is underappreciated both by society and by the law.
In the conception of father as breadwinner and provider, there is no
space for other aspects of fathering, such as caretaking; noncash support
like helping maintain property; providing means for travel or making
meals; or in-kind contributions in the form of food, clothing, toys, child
care, or other assistance.244 Fathers are valued solely for their paycheck.
Many fathers want to be able to contribute, and if they cannot contribute
financially, they want to be present and make other contributions when
they are able.245 In fact, many fathers do contribute to their children’s lives
through the purchasing of goods and services for their children, and they
prefer this type of contribution to just handing over money to the
government or the custodial parent.246 The most recent available data shows
that 61.3% of noncustodial parents provide at least some type of noncash
support for their children.247 Custodial mothers generally are not opposed
to these contributions, as especially low-income mothers “often conclude
that they are more likely to receive money from struggling low-income
fathers through informal payments.”248 Additionally, mothers often prefer
to have their child’s father engaged in their child’s life.249 Fathers who
provide in-kind contributions often deliver them in person, thereby
facilitating contact between themselves and their children.250
Class plays a pivotal role in child support law as well. “Most families
with incomes above $50,000 do not participate in the [child support]
program.”251 Until the 1970s, child support was not a public issue.252
“Absent parents were not pursued. . . . Paternity was rarely ascertained.”253
The primary reason for the shift in approach to child support was because
Congress wanted to reduce the federal cost of the child welfare system.254
Prior to the Child Support Act of 1974, “since the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) system was paying for the child, support
enforcement seemed quite unnecessary.”255 Any attempts to get fathers to
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Huntington, supra note 35, at 190.
Kohn, supra note 19, at 69, 90–91.
Id. at 91.
Kohn, supra note 19, at 91; Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1004–05.
GRALL, supra note 42, at 14.
Kohn, supra note 19, at 91.
Id. at 91–92.
Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1006.
SORENSEN, supra note 90, at 3.
Krause, supra note 211, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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pay child support were quickly dropped as “the funds thus collected . . . would only be offset against AFDC entitlements,”256 and might
harm family structures by driving fathers away.257
If people with wealth were failing to pay to support their children, the
state would have little interest in getting involved. After all, courts and
legislatures generally emphasize familial privacy and deference to parental
judgment when the welfare system is not implicated.258 The motivating
reason for the state’s involvement, both historically and in recent years, is a
desire to reduce the number of people who rely on the state for support.259
The state has a fiscal interest in cabining the responsibility for a child’s
well-being in the private sphere. Laura Rosenbury has articulated:
[T]he ultimate value underlying legal recognition of [the] family [is] the
value of private family support. The government affirmatively recognizes
certain intimate relationships . . . in order to incentivize individuals to
privately address the dependencies that often arise when adults care for
children . . . . Indeed, states originally recognized marriage and the parentchild relationship as a means to encourage men to assume responsibility
for women’s and children’s dependencies. . . . The government therefore
recognizes and bestows benefits on families so that they will serve a
private welfare function, minimizing reliance on state and federal
coffers. . . . Instead of bestowing positive rights “to cash welfare, to
housing, or to education,” states bestow the status of spouse, parent, or
child and attach limited benefits to them.260

Private solutions appeal not only to people who desire a fiscally conservative government but also to liberal feminists who have felt men should

256. Id. at 4–5.
257. Id. at 5.
258. See, e.g., HASDAY, supra note 56, at 196.
259. See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 104th Cong. 2
(1995) (opening statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson, member, S. Comm. On Fin.) (“Child support is
important in the welfare debate because, if child support is collected, mothers obviously have a better
chance of staying off welfare.”); STANLEY, supra note 79, at 116 (“There is, in just
principle, . . . nothing which a government has more clearly the right to do than to compel the lazy to
work.” (quoting 1 JOEL BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM
OF LEGAL EXPOSITION 273–74 (8th ed. 1892))); Alison Lefkovitz, Men in the House: Race, Welfare,
and the Regulation of Men’s Sexuality in the United States, 1961–1972, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 594,
610 (2011) (“Parental failure to support should be made a federal offense—because federal money is
involved.” (quoting testimony of Stanford University economist Roger Freeman, presidential advisor to
Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon)); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 79, at 1654 (“The ultimate goal of
these governmental efforts was . . . to force freed black people to comport with the heteronormative
ideal of the nation’s perceived national familial identity—the self-sufficient American family with a
working husband and a dependent wife and children—and to therefore absolve the government of
responsibility for financially supporting needy black women and children.” (footnotes omitted)).
260. Rosenbury, supra note 202, at 1866–67 (footnotes omitted).

3 LOLLAR 125-181 (DO NOT DELETE)

170

10/17/2018 10:52 AM

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1:125

be required to financially support the children they chose to bring into the
world.261
As a result, legislatures and courts focus on “personal responsibility,”
by which they “communicate that participating in heterosexual intercourse
has consequences, at least the risk of legally imposed child support obligations.”262 If families do not address their own needs as required under this
legal regime, “the state often intervenes in a punitive fashion.”263 But if
families have the resources to provide sufficient financial support for their
dependents, the state grants those family members the benefits of limited
intervention and disruption of the family relationships, heightened privacy,
and deference to the family judgments.264 In short, the state defers to
individual family members’ judgments when those families are middle- and
upper-class. If the individuals involved in those relationships could provide
private family support for their children, the state would only be minimally
involved, if at all—ideal from the state’s perspective.
The implications of the class-centeredness of these laws cannot be
overlooked. Fathers with little or no income are more likely to be incarcerated for failing to pay their child support obligations.265 The most
effective mechanism for ensuring compliance with child support obligations is the garnishment of wages.266 In fact, recent data suggests that
approximately 72%–75% of child support collections nationwide were
attributable to the withholding of income from noncustodial parents’ paychecks.267 But for fathers with little or no income, wage garnishment is not
an option, as most of these fathers do not have regular paychecks. As a
result, noncustodial parents with resources can avoid more significant
consequences, such as incarceration or a criminal conviction, whereas those
for whom wage garnishment is not an option face stiffer penalties.268
Poor fathers are also more likely to be affected by the many collateral
consequences that attach to child support arrears.269 These collateral
consequences include withholding of a driver’s or other professional
license;270 poor credit history; difficultly getting a bank account; and, in the
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Appleton, supra note 31, at 363–64; Mayeri, supra note 38, at 2299–300.
Appleton, supra note 31, at 360.
Rosenbury, supra note 202, at 1867.
HASDAY, supra note 56, at 196.
Brito, supra note 19, at 619–20.
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 34 tbl.P-29; SORENSEN, supra note 90,

at 5.
267. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 34 tbl.P-29 (approximating 72% of
2017 collections); SORENSEN, supra note 90, at 5.
268. SOLOMON-FEARS, SMITH & BERRY, supra note 9, at 13; Brito, supra note 19, at 619.
269. Hatcher, supra note 235, at 909–10.
270. Id. at 910; Kohn, supra note 19, at 70.
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event one does get a job with a steady paycheck, garnishment of 65% of
any wages.271 These consequences often have a direct impact on an
economically disadvantaged father’s work opportunities and access to
parenting time.272 Whereas a father with sufficient financial means likely
could work around these hurdles, for someone with little to no income, not
being able to drive to work or get a professional license that would allow
for a regular income can have devastating effects. These consequences are
all in addition to the previously discussed burdens carried by someone with
a criminal conviction.
As a result, “[t]he world of child support quickly suffocates poor
fathers in a combination of deep frustration and apathy.”273 Aggressive
child support enforcement for those who cannot afford to pay is counterproductive. The consequence is likely to be reduced payments.274 Similarly,
“[e]nforcement can alienate a father to the point that he can become
unwilling to work with the mother to best support their child.”275 These
results are not beneficial for the child in the middle of this system, the
custodial parent relying on this income, or the state seeking to receive
reimbursement.
Because statistics are not kept, one can only rely on anecdotal evidence
and inference to reach the inevitable conclusion that race interacts with
gender and class in the child support system as well. Evidence suggests
criminalizing the failure to pay child support disproportionately affects
noncustodial African-American parents.276 More than half of the custodial
parents who receive both state assistance and child support are people of
color;277 27% are African-American and 20% are Latino.278 Several studies
suggest that arrests for nonpayment of child support occur far more often in
minority communities.279 Certainly disparities in arrest, conviction, and
incarceration rates between white and black men occur with regularity in
other areas of the criminal justice system.280
The invocation of the criminal justice system to address issues of child
support debt has contributed to the incarceration problem in this country.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Hatcher, supra note 235, at 909–10.
Id. at 910; Kohn, supra note 19, at 70–71.
Hatcher, supra note 235, at 910.
Kohn, supra note 19, at 83–84.
Id. at 82.
SOLOMON-FEARS, SMITH & BERRY, supra note 9, at 15.
KYE LIPPOLD & ELAINE SORENSEN, THE URBAN INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES
SERVED BY THE CHILD SUPPORT (IV-D) PROGRAM: 2010 CENSUS SURVEY RESULTS 9 (2013).
278. Id. at 9.
279. REBECCA MAY, CTR. ON FATHERS, FAMILIES & PUB. POL’Y, THE EFFECT OF CHILD
SUPPORT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS ON LOW-INCOME NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS 19 (2004).
280. Id. at 18–19.
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Black men are disproportionately represented in the prison population.
Many of them are incarcerated for their failure to pay child support; others
have child support obligations that remain outstanding during their period
of incarceration. More than half of all inmates have at least one child under
the age of eighteen.281 Approximately a quarter of all those incarcerated in
the U.S. have a child support case.282 These numbers do not account for
those incarcerated in local jails.
As previously discussed, a father’s incarceration has a negative effect
not only on his ability to pay off any debts but also on his ability to support
a child financially or otherwise.283 More than five million children have a
parent who lived with them become incarcerated at some point in the
child’s life, and children of color again are disproportionately affected.284
Children with an incarcerated parent usually are living in low-income
families of color, often with a young, single mother of limited education.285
“African-American and Latino [children] are over seven and two times
more likely, respectively,” than white children “to have a parent
incarcerated.”286
Children encounter numerous barriers to continuing a relationship with
an incarcerated parent. In addition to the fact that fathers often are incarcerated at facilities in far away, inaccessible locations, the nature of a
child’s interactions with her father are greatly curtailed. Usually there is no
direct physical contact permitted, conversations are monitored, and the
length of time one can visit is limited and only permitted during certain
windows of time.287 Phone calls, which are the most common form of
communication with an incarcerated parent, are outrageously expensive
and are monitored by corrections authorities.288 Letters are likewise monitored.289 In short, nothing about the set-up is conducive to encouraging a
parental relationship.
Numerous studies document the negative effects of a parent’s
incarceration on a child’s well-being.290 One recent study indicated that
approximately two-thirds of fathers never received a visit from their child

281. Child Support and Incarceration, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 6,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-incarceration.aspx.
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 20, at 327–29.
284. Id. at 328.
285. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 155, at 2.
286. Id.
287. Dennis, supra note 20, at 328.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 328–29; Kohn, supra note 19, at 85–86.
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while incarcerated.291 A study of fathers in prison found that almost 42% of
fathers who did not live with their child prior to incarceration only had
contact with their child once a month or less.292 Absent fathers can lead to
increased mental health issues, diminished levels of school achievement,
disproportionate representation in the juvenile justice system, and greater
risk of adolescent pregnancy.293 “[F]or children who seek relationships with
their fathers, paternal interactions can have a significant positive emotional
impact.”294 As already discussed, when fathers positively engage with their
children, they can play important roles in the lives and successes of their
children.295
The intersectionality of gender, class, and race undergird our child
support system. Here, we see the well-documented move toward privatizing the family law system and the subsequent effect on poor families
running headlong into the criminal justice system, with devastating and
deeply troubling effects. The privatization of family law is used to justify
criminal sanctions for a failure to pay a private debt or failure to reimburse
the state so the privatization remains complete. As a result, many men are
incarcerated in what amounts to a modern-day debtors’ prison. This system
neither benefits children nor is an effective or cost-efficient system for the
state.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Documenting concerns about the current child support system raises
numerous questions regarding how best to address the concerns while also
ensuring that children grow up with the resources and support they need.
A. The Need for Better and More Transparent Data
A close analysis of the system reveals just how little information is
available. According to this author’s research, no state or federal agency
documents or reports the number of people prosecuted or incarcerated for a
criminal charge of failing to pay child support.296 Without such data,
knowing the full extent of the problem is impossible. Any proposal for
291. MINDY HERMAN-STAHL, MARNI L. KAN & TASSELI MCKAY, INCARCERATION AND THE
FAMILY: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND PROMISING APPROACHES FOR SERVING FATHERS AND FAMILIES
§ 4.2.1 (2008).
292. Kohn, supra note 19, at 77.
293. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 155, at 3; Kohn, supra note 19, at 85–86.
294. Kohn, supra note 19, at 85.
295. Id. at 85–86.
296. Similarly, no agency appears to be keeping data on how many people are civilly detained
for failing to pay child support.
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fixing the system must start with a requirement that states and the federal
government collect that data.
Similarly, the data collected by the Office of Child Support
Enforcement should be separated out in a clear and accessible manner,
separate from data related to foster care and other programs. Information
related to how much money is going to reimburse state and federal governments for state assistance programs should be distinct from that going
toward the foster care system. Information about the fact that the government is both funding and getting reimbursed by the system should be
clearly identified, and data looking at the system without that subsidy
should be analyzed.
B. Changes to the Child Support Calculations
In order to avoid some of the current problems, the surface level fix
would simply be to make several changes to the child support system to
better ensure it protects a child’s welfare. One could argue that we need to
change the way child support obligations are calculated. Child support
formulas should be adapted to ensure that the child support ordered actually
correlates with the father’s ability to pay. Part of this may entail removing
“potential” income from the calculation, having a more realistic assessment
of liquid assets in the child support formula, and allowing for easier modifications of child support orders if a parent’s financial circumstance changes.
Child support obligations should be suspended while a parent is incarcerated, and the law should be changed so interest no longer accrues on
child support obligations.
Last year, the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE),
which works with state and tribal governments to enforce and facilitate
consistent child support payments, modified the federal regulations governing child support orders to try and ensure that the amount of child support
ordered more closely matches the noncustodial parent’s actual income.297
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
recently promulgated a federal regulation entitled “Flexibility, Efficiency,
and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs,” whose aim is
to “give states needed flexibility to increase the accuracy and accountability of support orders.”298 According to an overview released by DHHS,
“[r]esearch finds that setting an accurate order based upon the noncustodial
parent’s ability to pay improves the chances that the parent will comply

297. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 8.
298. Id. at 1; see also Flexibility, Efficiency, and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement
Programs, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,492 (Dec. 20, 2016).
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with the support order and continue to pay over time.”299
The recent changes also allow for new consideration of a parent’s
incarceration. Prior to the passage of this regulation, most states barred
noncustodial parents from seeking review and adjustment of their child
support obligations if they were incarcerated, thus treating incarceration as
“voluntary unemployment.” Recognizing that those who are incarcerated
“usually have limited earnings ability while in prison,” leading to the
accrual of “tens of thousands of dollars of child support debt that interfere
with employment success, [and] resulting in higher rates of nonpayment
upon release from prison,” the new regulation requires that a state “not
exclude incarceration from consideration as a substantial change in circumstances, such as by treating incarceration as ‘voluntary unemployment.’”300
“[A]fter learning that a parent who owes support will be incarcerated for
more than 180 calendar days, the state must either send a notice to both
parents of the right to request a review and adjustment or automatically
initiate a review and adjustment after notifying both parents.”301
Similarly, in a promising move, the new regulation allows a custodial
parent to seek help in establishing paternity through child support services
without requiring the court to impose a child support obligation if paternity
is ascertained and neither parent desires such an obligation.302 It also allows
for states to close cases if a court has determined that collection of the
support obligation is “extremely unlikely based on the circumstances, such
as very serious work-limiting disability of the noncustodial parent.”303
These new provisions went into effect in early 2017.304 As a result, it is
too soon to tell whether they will be implemented in a manner that is
effective in reducing child support debt and helping noncustodial parents
and their children. By removing at least one obstacle toward cooperation
between a child’s parents—namely the requirement that the court impose
child support once paternity is ascertained, whether the custodial parent
wants that or not—the new regulation opens the door to other legal changes
that might help to strengthen the position of poor and working-class
fathers.
C. Eliminating Debtors’ Prisons
A requisite first step in keeping people from being incarcerated for
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 8, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
45 C.F.R. §§ 301–05, 307–09 (2016).
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failing to pay child support is the decriminalization of the act. At the very
least, removing criminal sanctions would lead to less incarceration for
failing to pay than we currently have, and it would eliminate the stigma and
the collateral consequences that attend a criminal conviction. Yet, as has
been discussed at length in the context of the decriminalization of other
misdemeanors, decriminalization can have significant downsides.
Professor Alexandra Natapoff has written extensively about the negative consequences that accompany decriminalization. Professor Natapoff
explains,
[D]ecriminalization represents the next generation of the “netwidening” phenomenon. Net-widening refers to reforms that make it
easier to sweep individuals into the criminal process, and decriminalization does so in sophisticated ways. . . . [It does so] by turning to
supervision and fines as indirect, long-term constraints on defendant
behavior, and by extending the informal consequences of a citation or
conviction deep into offenders’ social and economic lives. . . .
....
. . . [Decriminalization] exemplifies a larger institutional and social
compromise: the embrace of more diffuse and less formal modes of
punishment as a way of adapting America’s massive criminal apparatus to
a new age of resource scarcity and unease about mass incarceration.305

One can certainly envision how removing criminal sanctions from the
child support system could still have the negative effects Professor
Natapoff discusses. Already with civil enforcement procedures in place, a
noncustodial parent delinquent on his child support obligations can be
incarcerated for an unpredictable period of time without ever seeing a
lawyer.306 Although the stigma and collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction are absent, this option does not seem dramatically better for the
father, the child, or the state. Incarceration through this type of “punitive
injunction” will not make the father any more able to pay than he was prior
to the incarceration.307 Rather, this approach becomes just another way of
“manag[ing] the poor and socially marginal”308 and sending a message
about the “moral depravity” of fathers who are in this position.309
Despite these apparent downsides, legislators should still decriminalize
the failure to pay child support. But in addition, incarceration should be
removed as a punishment for civil contempt, the charge states use to punish
so-called “deadbeat dads” on the civil side. Legislatures should adopt the
305.
(2015).
306.
307.
308.
309.

Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1059, 1061
See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448–49 (2011).
See Nirej S. Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 178 (2014).
Id. at 192.
Id. at 215.
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language proposed by Professor Natapoff: “No defendant shall be incarcerated for civil contempt or given extended supervision or probation
solely because of a failure to make full payments of fees, fines, or costs
under this provision.”310 As Natapoff points out, this type of statutory
language would “bring civil contempt into closer alignment with
constitutional doctrine that constrains criminal law,” alluding to Bearden
and its predecessor cases.311 Similarly, the law should make clear that civil
offenses, such as civil contempt, “do not give rise to a criminal record or
other collateral consequences.”312
Legislators should also remove the federal requirement that custodial
parents “assign” their child support income to the government when they
seek state assistance. Poor fathers should not be financing the state’s
“welfare” program or facing any sort of sanction if they are unable to do so.
States should budget their state assistance programs without counting on
this income.
Although they number fewer than most people think, parents who have
the ability to pay but are not actually paying child support do exist. As
previously indicated, however, those with the ability to pay are usually not
the ones who end up with a criminal record or sanctions. Wage garnishment and tax refund offsets are effective ways of getting payments from
those more well-to-do individuals.
D. Define “Child Support” More Broadly
In recognition of the current practice in many families and the desires
of many custodial and noncustodial parents, the child support system
should recognize and value a noncustodial parent’s nonfinancial contributions equal to the financial ones. If having the father present in his child’s
life is most important for the child’s development and well-being, the law
should recognize as much and facilitate, rather than impede, these interactions. If criminal sanctions and incarceration are removed as barriers to a
father’s interactions with his child, those changes, in conjunction with a
legal recognition of a father’s full range of parenting skills, will go a long
way toward encouraging a father’s presence in his child’s life.
Changing the law to permit in-kind contributions would help remove
some of the barriers to father–child engagement, as evidence has shown
that in-kind contributions encourage paternal involvement.313 Many Afri-

310.
311.
312.
313.

Natapoff, supra note 305, at 1112.
Id.
Id. at 1113.
Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1005.
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can-American fathers with little to no income regularly make in-kind
contributions.314 In fact, fathers with little to no income often prefer to
make in-kind contributions, viewing the purchase of a few “symbolically
important items” such as diapers, baby formula, and shoes as of “greater
value and significance” than making cash payments.315 These contributions
can feel more visible and enduring than cash contributions.316
As Laurie Kohn has suggested, noncash support could be utilized in a
manner similar to that provided by the guidelines regulating child support
on Native-American land.317 Federal regulations permit Native American
tribes to allow “noncash payments” to satisfy child support obligations.318
The child support order outlines the specific dollar amount of the child
support obligation and what type of noncash support will be permitted to
satisfy that particular dollar amount.319 An OCSE publication provides an
example:
[A] [t]ribal support order could provide that an obligor owes $200 a
month in current support, which may be satisfied with the provision of
firewood suitable for home heating and cooling to the custodial parent and
child. The order could provide that a cord of firewood has a specific
dollar value of $100 based on the prevailing market. Therefore, the
obligor would satisfy his support obligation by providing two cords of
firewood every month.320

Fathers also should be encouraged to be both caregivers and breadwinners.321 Many fathers want to spend time with their children but feel
they should only do so if they have money to spend on them.322 The law
should aid fathers in engaging in caretaking responsibilities, thereby increasing their involvement in their children’s lives. In fact, many AfricanAmerican fathers with little income see their children regularly.323 These
fathers “take their children to and from school, help [their children]
with . . . homework, take them to the doctor, and [spend time with] them

314. Id. at 1004–05.
315. Id. at 1005.
316. Id.
317. Kohn, supra note 19, at 90 & n.164; see also 45 C.F.R. § 309.105 (2016).
318. 45 C.F.R. § 309.105(a)(3).
319. 45 C.F.R. § 309.105(a)(3)(i)–(ii). The current federal guidelines do not permit payments
that custodial parents have assigned to the state to be satisfied by noncash payments. 45 C.F.R.
§ 309.105(a)(3)(iii).
320. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, TRIBAL AND STATE JURISDICTION TO ESTABLISH AND
ENFORCE CHILD SUPPORT 74 (2007), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/tribal-and-state-jurisdictionto-establish-and-enforce-child-support.
321. Huntington, supra note 35, at 234.
322. Id. at 211.
323. Maldonado, supra note 30, at 1006.
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while their mothers [are at] work or run[ning] errands.”324 As with in-kind
contributions, the law should find a way to value these interactions and take
them into consideration as part of the father’s support obligation.
Of course, there may be times when encouraging a child’s “highquality relationship with each parent”325 is not feasible. For example, if a
father has been abusive to the child, fostering a relationship with him
simply may not be a good option. As others have recognized, “it is essential
that the reforms not compromise safety.”326 Likewise, there may be times
when one parent is not particularly interested in having a relationship with
his or her child. The changes proposed here are not intended to require a
parent’s involvement in his or her child’s life; rather, they are meant to
facilitate the child’s relationship with each parent to the extent that relationship is desired by both parties. Unfortunately, nothing the law can do will
cause a parent to have a change of heart regarding the desire to participate
in the life of his or her child. But the law can remove obstacles in a manner
that encourages parents who want that relationship to be able to have it.
E. Establishing Support Services for Poor Fathers
A family’s resources can affect a child’s development. As a result, at
the time when a court enters a child support order, a realistic assessment of
the father’s earning potential should be established. Currently, not all states
require a noncustodial parent to be present when a child support order is
entered. As a result, the noncustodial parent cannot advocate for himself
and inform the court or administrative hearing officer of his income status.
Instead, courts and administrative officers are dependent on the custodial
parent’s assessment of her coparent’s resources. The law should prohibit
courts and administrative officers from entering child support orders in
absentia. Otherwise, courts will have a difficult time accurately assessing a
father’s earning potential.
Once that change is made, an additional part of the process should
include identifying those fathers who are lacking in education or vocational
training or who are suffering from some type of disability that might
prevent them from contributing financially to their children’s upbringing.
Each state already has a variety of resources in place through the Department of Education to work with people who need rehabilitation and job
training. A mechanism should be put in place to connect these particularly
vulnerable fathers with the already-existing state Divisions of Vocational

324. Id.
325. Huntington, supra note 35, at 236.
326. Id. at 237.
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Services and Rehabilitation Services Administrations who can help them
with job training and vocational rehabilitative services. Because these programs already exist, this proposal would be a cost-effective method of
helping these fathers expand their options and increase the chances that
they might be able to financially contribute to their children’s upbringing.
F. Re-envisioning the Child Support System?
Although the changes discussed in the previous parts might make our
current child support system better, simply amending the current system
does not address the deeper question of whether the current child support
system is so fundamentally broken that we should abandon it in favor of a
new approach. One issue raised by this Article is whether the child support
system should be regulated by states at all. In almost no other area do states
regulate the enforcement of debts between two private parties. With child
support obligations, not only do states heavily regulate the enforcement of
those debts, but federal and state laws also prohibit a noncustodial parent
from discharging the debt in bankruptcy proceedings. In other words, if a
noncustodial parent incurs child support debt, he will be stuck with that
debt and the interest it accrues for life.
For that portion of child support debt that a noncustodial parent owes to
the state to reimburse it and the federal government for the costs of state
assistance provided to the custodial parent, the set-up is equally, if not
more, problematic. Although the government has long been reluctant to
provide financial assistance to those who are poor and struggling to make
ends meet, the reality is that every state and the federal government
continue to have some version of state assistance. Many find the argument
that the state should step in and ensure that everyone has some minimal
level of provisions persuasive: “If fathers do not pay child support, then the
state pays what the mother is owed.”327 Most do not realize that the state is
expecting noncustodial parents with little to no income to reimburse the
state for those obligations. Certainly for noncustodial parents who are in a
position to do so, that reimbursement might be appropriate. But most of the
custodial parents who are requesting and receiving state assistance do not
share a child with a noncustodial parent of such means. The state’s expectation of reimbursement from these fathers of no and low income seems
unrealistic.
Yet the state goes beyond simply expecting a poor father to reimburse
the costs of state assistance. The state expends additional resources to
327. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 35, at 235 (discussing how many European countries have
such a child support guarantee, despite its political infeasibility in the U.S.).
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enforce this financial obligation. In fact, the Office of Child Support
Enforcement’s very name exemplifies this focus. The government spends
money to track down the noncustodial parent and take them to court in
order to try to get money from parents who usually do not have any, or
very little, to give. Every year, the government spends money trying to
establish paternity in approximately one and a half million cases in order to
get these fathers under supervision of the child support system.328 In 2016,
over 1.7 million cases “[r]equir[ed] [s]ervices to [e]stablish a [s]upport
[o]rder.”329 In the event a father does not pay, additional state money is
spent incarcerating him to try to obtain payment. This is not a cost-effective
system, and it certainly does nothing to help the welfare of the child or the
fiscal well-being of the state, as has already been discussed.
This Article could take the position that the current child support
system should be entirely dismantled and replaced with a different method
of helping children grow and flourish despite coming from a family with
little or no income. The odds of such a dramatic change occurring are slim,
however, and despite the strong appeal of this proposal, this author has
chosen to consider more realistic options that might actually have a chance
of successfully being implemented. Many of the changes outlined above
could go far toward making the child support system a very different and
better functioning system.
CONCLUSION
The child support system “perpetuates the traditional gender norm that
fathers are valuable only as breadwinners.”330 Ultimately, only if we are
able to unmoor our deeply class- and race-based ideas about gender roles
will we be in a position to effectively change our laws to encourage fathers
to realize their full potential, which will in turn allow their children and
their children’s mothers to fully embrace their own paths.
For now, the child support system remains yet another government
program that reinforces cycles of poverty and criminal justice involvement
for poor fathers. Criminal law should not play a role in sanctioning people
for failing to pay either a private debt or a public debt incurred because the
person’s former partner sought state assistance. Instead, legislators and
courts should make changes to the child support system so that it more
effectively promotes and protects a child’s well-being.

328. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 175, at 76 tbl.P-71.
329. Id. at 83 tbl.P-78.
330. Huntington, supra note 35, at 233.

